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The thesis contains four chapters on the structure and predictability of individual
dierences
Chapter 1. Re-analyses data from Holt and Laury's (2002) risk aversion ex-
periments. Shows that big-stakes hypothetical payos are better than small-stakes
real-money payos for predicting choices in big-stakes real-money gambles (in spite
of the presence of hypothetical bias). Argues that hypothetical bias is a problem for
calibration of mean preferences but not for prediction of the rank order of subjects'
preferences.
Chapter 2. Describes an experiment: Participants were given personality tests
and played a series of dictator and response games over a two week period. It was
found that social preferences are one-dimensional, stable across a two-week interval
and signicantly related to the Big Five personality traits. Suggestions are given
about ways to modify existing theories of social preference to accommodate these
ndings.
Chapter 3. Applies a novel statistical technique (spectral clustering) to a per-
sonality data set for the rst time. Finds the HEXACO six-factor structure in an
English-language ve-factor questionnaire for the rst time. Argues that the empha-
sis placed on weak relationships is critical to settling the dimensionality debate within
personality theory, and that spectral clustering provides a more useful perspective
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on personality data than does traditional factor analysis.
Chapter 4. Outlines the relevance of extraversion for economics, and sets up a
model to argue that personality dierences in extraversion may have evolved through
something akin to a war of attrition. This model implies a positive relationship be-
tween extraversion and risk aversion, and a U-shaped relationship between extraver-
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Chapter 1
Predicting Risky Behavior: a
Re-analysis of Holt and Laury's data
This paper argues that choices with large but hypothetical payos may be more
useful for predicting subjects' important decisions than the small-stakes, real-money
payos typically used in economics experiments. We use data from Holt and Laury
(2002) and show that big-stakes, real-money choices are more accurately predicted
with earlier big-stakes hypothetical choices than with earlier small-stakes, real-money
choices. This result holds in spite of the presence of a hypothetical bias which causes
subjects to report less risk aversion in hypothetical treatments. It is argued that
hypothetical bias should be thought of as a mean level bias rather than a rank order
bias. Experimenters who are interested in calibrating the mean level of subjects'
risk preferences are recommended to avoid hypothetical payos, but experimenters




The use of hypothetical payos within economic experiments is controversial. Hy-
pothetical payos did receive early support from Kahneman and Tversky (1979):
Experimental studies typically involve contrived gambles for small stakes,
and a large number of repetitions of very similar problems. These features
of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation of the results and
restrict their generality. By default, the method of hypothetical choices
emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoret-
ical questions can be investigated. The use of the method relies on the
assumption that people often know how they would behave in actual sit-
uations of choice, and on the further assumption that the subjects have
no special reason to disguise their true preferences.
But recent authors have been more skeptical. Both Laury and Holt (2008) and Har-
rison (2007) are somewhat hostile to the use of non-monetary payos, suggesting
that they result in hypothetical bias. Hypothetical bias is the tendency for sub-
jects to report themselves to be less risk averse with hypothetical payos then they
are with equivalent real-valued payos. Both papers argue that because average
reported preferences dier systematically in real vs. hypothetical treatments, re-
searchers should use only real payos. In a similar vein, Holt and Laury (2002) write
that their results (which exhibit hypothetical bias)
[Raise] questions about the validity of Kahneman and Tversky's suggested
technique of using hypothetical questionnaires to address issues that in-
volve very high stakes. In particular, it casts doubt on their assumption
that people often know how they would behave in actual situations of
choice.
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These arguments, however, are directed primarily at researchers who are attempting
to estimate the mean level of risk preference (e.g. to calibrate a model for a rep-
resentative agent). But measures of risk preferences are not only used to calibrate
averagesthey are sometimes used to control for individual variation. A researcher
may want to control for individual variation in risk attitudes when subjects play a
game that involves an element of risk, or when testing the relationship between risk
preferences and other choices such as health behaviors or asset allocations. In these
sorts of situations, researchers are interested in the rank order of subjects' prefer-
ences but not the mean level. Here, hypothetical bias is not a problem if it merely
introduces a constant bias into all subjects' reported levels of risk aversion. As long
as the rank order of subjects' risk preferences is preserved then risk attitudes elicited
by hypothetical payos will still be strongly correlated with those elicited by real
payos.
If hypothetical tasks can provide a valid method to control for risk attitudes,
it is clear that they have several advantages over real-money tasks. Not only do
hypothetical tasks save the nancial costs associated with paying out money and the
administrative costs of creating a system to pay out money, but they can also exist
on a more appropriate scale than real payos. Economists are often interested in
how people make decisions when risks are substantial: getting education, buying a
house, buying insurance, saving for retirement, choosing a job, starting a business,
et cetera; but economists are generally constrained to design risk-based experiments
on a much smaller scalegenerally only a few dollars rather than the thousands
or even hundreds of thousands of dollars at stake in the real-life decisions. But
hypothetical tasks are not similarly constrained: it is possible to ask people how
they would behave with stakes as large as the researcher desires. This matters
because subjects may exhibit dierent risk attitudes at dierent payo scales, and
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so small-stakes real-money payos may be tapping risk preferences at the wrong
scale if the researcher is really interested in bigger choices as listed above. Some
evidence from the importance of scale comes from Holt and Laury (2002), who show
that their data are inconsistent with the constant relative risk aversion model and
conclude that subjects' preferences are not the same across scales. The analysis in
section 1.3 will reinforce this conclusion.
So: can researchers use hypothetical tasks to control for risk attitudes? Do such
tasks preserve the rank order of subjects' true preferences, if not the average? To
my knowledge, this is the rst paper which addresses the question directly, though
there are a small number of papers which deal with it indirectly. Andersen and
Mellor (2009) show that hypothetical-payo risk attitudes are only weakly related
to real-payo risk preferences and they also note that in previous literature it is the
hypothetical-payo preferences which have been better validated against real-world
behaviors such as nancial investment, insurance demand, risky health behaviors,
education, marriage, and fertility. Similarly, Guiso and Paiella (2005) show that
occupational choice and moving behavior are further real-world correlates of hypo-
thetical risk preferences.
Thus there is some evidence to suggest that hypothetical payos are at least as
good as real payos for sorting subjects by their risk preferences in order to predict
real world behaviors. But to my knowledge there are no head-to-head tests in which
big-stakes hypothetical payos compete against small-stakes real payos to predict
choices with big-stakes real payos. That is the object of this study.
The data for the current study are those collected by Holt and Laury for their 2002
paper Risk aversion and incentive eects. The precise details of their procedure are
given in section 1.2.2.1, but for now it will suce to give a general outline of their
procedure: the Holt-Laury experiment involved completing a series of ten binary
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gambles in each of four separate tasks. Tasks were completed in the same sequence
for all subjects, and most subjects completed all four tasks (some subjects only
completed three tasks, but they are omitted from the present analysis). Each task
has the same general structure, but the payos in the dierent tasks may be real or
hypothetical, and they exist at dierent scales. Particularly, Task 1 is small-stakes
with real money, Task 2 is big-stakes but hypothetical, Task 3 is big-stakes with real
money, and Task 4 is just like Task 1. The exact numbers used in each task are
shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. For the current analysis, the most important feature
of Holt and Laury's design is that the third task involved amounts which are large
relative to undergraduate earnings (subjects could win up to $346.50 on this task),
and that it was preceded by one task with hypothetical money on the same scale
and by another task with real money on a much smaller scale (maximum winnings
on Task 1 were $3.85). Thus we can directly test if choices in big-stakes real money
gambles are better predicted by choices in big-stakes hypothetical gambles or by
choices in small-stakes real-money gambles. This analysis is described in section 1.3,
but to preview the result: the hypothetical payos have greater predictive power.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 1.2 gives more detail on
the experimental set up, section 1.3 describes the analysis, and section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Method
1.2.1 Participants and demographics
Holt and Laury (2002) report data on 212 subjects. Of these, 130 were assigned to
complete all of the experimental tasks. Only these subjects were used for the present
analysis. The average year of birth of the subjects was 1975, with a standard devi-
ation of six years. Sixty-nine of the subjects (53%) were men; further demographic
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information can be found in the associated data le.
1.2.2 Measures
1.2.2.1 The Holt-Laury Task
Holt and Laury's (2002) procedure measures subjects' risk preferences through a
series of four tasks, each of which contains ten binary choices between lotteries.
Each binary choice is between a safe option (A) and a risky option (B). One
example binary choice would be the following:
Option A (safe)
• a 60% chance of getting $2, and a 40% chance of getting $1.60
Option B (risky)
• a 60% chance of getting $3.85, and a 40% chance of getting $0.10
Notice that the probabilities are the same in the safe and risky options but that the
variance of payos is larger for the risky option; this feature is true for each of the
HL binary choices. For the example above, the expected value of Option A is $1.84
and the expected value of Option B is $2.35. Thus an expected-payo maximizing
subject would choose the risky option, but a subject who was more concerned with
minimizing the variance of possible outcomes might make the safe choice.
Table 1.1 presents the ten binary choices presented to subjects in the rst task.
Subjects were not, however, shown the nal expected payo dierence column
of that table. The example above corresponds to the sixth row of Table 1.1. As
one proceeds down the table, the expected value of both A & B increases as the
likelihood of the better outcome within each pair rises, but the expected value of the
risky option rises faster than the expected value of the safe option.
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Table 1.1: The Ten Paired Lottery Choices with 1x Payos used in Tasks 1 & 4
Option A (safe) Option B (risky) Expected
payo
dierence
1/10 of $2 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85 9/10 of $0.10 $1.17
2/10 of $2 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85 8/10 of $0.10 $0.83
3/10 of $2 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85 7/10 of $0.10 $0.50
4/10 of $2 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85 6/10 of $0.10 $0.16
5/10 of $2 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85 5/10 of $0.10 -$0.18
6/10 of $2 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85 4/10 of $0.10 -$0.51
7/10 of $2 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85 3/10 of $0.10 -$0.85
8/10 of $2 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85 2/10 of $0.10 -$1.18
9/10 of $2 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85 1/10 of $0.10 -$1.52
10/10 of $2 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85 0/10 of $0.10 -$1.85
Note: for 20x, 50x and 90x treatments, the payos are scaled to:
20x: Option A is $40 or $32 Option B is $77 or $2
50x: Option A is $100 or $80 Option B is $192.50 or $5
90x: Option A is $180 or $144 Option B is $346.50 or $9
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Thus, an expected-value-maximizing risk-neutral subject would pick the safe Op-
tion A for the rst four rows and then switch over to the risky Option B for the nal
six rows. Risk averse subjects might switch from safe to risky at a later point, but
the general pattern of choosing Option A initially (since the expected payo is higher
and the variance is lower) and Option B later (since, by the tenth row, there is no
uncertainty and a higher payo) should hold for all subjects.
Subjects were required to indicate a preference for Option A or Option B for each
of the ten paired choices in Table 1.1. Subjects were informed ex ante that one of the
choices would be randomly selected ex post and played out in order to determine the
earnings for that task. Holt and Laury note that while we might expect incentives to
be diluted by the use of only random selection of a single decision for each task, that
in fact subjects did appear to take even the low-payo condition seriously, often
beginning with the easier choices at the top and bottom of the table, with choices
near their switch point more likely to be crossed out and changed (Holt and Laury,
2002).
The four tasks of the HL experiments were all based around this framework. The
only dierence from task to task is in the scale of the payos and whether or not the
payos were hypothetical. The scale of the payos was varied as a between-subjects
treatment, with some subjects being oered potential payos 20 times those pre-
sented in Table 1.1, some being oered payos 50 times those presented in Table
1.1, and others being oered payos 90 times those in Table 1.1. The real vs. hy-
pothetical payo distinction was a within-subjects variable, so that subjects faced
three real payos and one hypothetical payo. The four tasks were as follows:
Task 1 : real payos equal to 1x the values in Table 1.1
Task 2 : hypothetical payos equal to either 20x, 50x, or 90x the values
in Table 1.1
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Task 3 : real payos, matched to those oered in Task 2
Task 4 : real payos equal to 1x the values in Table 1.1 (same as Task 1)
The outcome of each task was determined by rolling a ten-sided die in front of the
subject before the next task began. Note that this could create an uncontrolled source
of variation due to wealth eects from early tasks, but Holt and Laury controlled
for this by requiring subjects to give up their winnings from Task 1 in order to be
allowed to participate in Task 3. Since the scale of payos is so much higher in Task
3, all subjects agreed to this condition, and there was therefore no selection bias.
There was of course no similar requirement for participation in Task 4, since subjects
would not have been willing to forgo their large earnings from Task 31.
1.2.2.2 Other Measures
There is more than one way to measure subjects' behavior in these tasks. One method
is to count the total number of safe choices made in each task. Another method is
to record the number of safe choices made by subjects before they rst switch over
to choosing the risky option. Ideally, these two measures would be identical. Alas,
experimental subjects are not all rational agents with and well-behaved preferences,
so these measures are not the same and we must decide which to use. Most of the
present study will refer to switchpoints, but the robustness of the results to using
the average number of safe choices is considered in section 1.3.5.
1One potential problem with the results from Holt & Laury (2002) is that at each of the three
campuses where experiments were run, they took place over more than one day, so there is a risk
that later subjects heard about the experimental details from the earlier subjects and were thus
contaminated. If this were a problem, it could show up by adding noise to the responses given
in Task 1 by the contaminated subjects (since they would know that the task doesn't count for
anything). Unfortunately, data on which subjects participated on which days is not available, but
I tested for possible contamination by splitting the subjects into rst half and second half and
checking to see if the results are stable, and I found that they are.
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1.3 Results
1.3.1 Descriptive statistics and hypothetical bias
Table 1.3 shows the average switchpoint by task and by treatment. The most im-
portant feature of these data for present purposes is the appearance of hypothetical
bias: subjects made an average of 4.8 safe choices before their switchpoint in Task
2, but they made 6.1 safe choices before their switchpoint on Task 3, even though
Tasks 2 and 3 had payos of exactly the same nominal size. Furthermore, note that
hypothetical bias increases with the payos: there were an extra 0.9 safe choices in
Task 3 for the 20x treatment, but 2.0 extra safe choices in the 50x treatment and 2.2
extra safe choices in the 90x treatment. The fact that this gap trends upwards with
the scale of the payos lends credence to the idea that it is indeed hypothetical bias.
But it's worth re-stating the argument made in section 1.1: hypothetical bias
would clearly be a problem if we wanted to use Task 2 switchpoints to predict the
average switchpoint in Task 3, but the bias is not necessarily a problem if we merely
wish to predict the rank order of our subjects' switchpoints in Task 3.
1.3.2 Comparing predictive power
Here we will test which is the better predictor of the Task 3 (big, real) switch-
pointthe Task 1 (small, real) switchpoint, or the Task 2 (big, hypothetical) switch-
point. Implicitly, we are testing whether it is more important for the predictor to be
similar in the size dimension or similar in the real/hypothetical dimension.
Note that all estimates reported in Tables 1.4 through 1.11 are based on stan-
dardized coecients (variables are normalized to have mean=zero, variance=one),
so the coecients can be interpreted as partial correlations.
Table 1.4 reports three models which predict the Task 3 switchpoint as a function
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of earlier choices. Model 1 uses only Task 1 as a predictor (as well as dummies
to control for treatmentthese are also used in Models 2 and 3), Model 2 uses
only Task 2 as a predictor, and Model 3 uses both Tasks 1 and 2. By comparing
Models 1 and 2, we can see thatseparatelyboth of the earlier switchpoints are
signicant predictors of the Task 3 switchpoint, and that the Task 2 has a higher
partial correlation (.55 vs .42) and a higher R-squared (.39 vs .26). The dierence
in residual variances, however, is not signicant (Bartlett's test of equal variances:
χ2 = 12.6, p = 0.76). Model 3 allows us to see how the Task 1 & 2 switchpoints
perform when they are place head-to-head, and the result is again that Task 2 has a
higher partial correlation (.47 vs .16) and greater statistical signicance. In order to
test if one of the coecients is greater, we can conduct a test of the null hypothesis
that Task 1 is a better predictor (i.e. that 1 > 2, which would be true if hypothetical
bias were a problem for prediction) against the alternative that Task 2 is a better
predictor (i.e. that 1 < 2). The resulting (one-tailed) p-value is 0.02 and the null
hypothesis is thus rejected at the 5% level, lending support to the notion that the
hypothetical task is a better predictor.
1.3.3 Restricting the sample
Table 1.5 repeats the structure of Table 1.4, but with the sample restricted to the 18
subjects who participated in the extremely high (90x) treatment. This comparison is
interesting because subjects in the 90x treatment were those for whom the dierence
in the scale of the payos was largest andas noted in section 1.3.1they were
the subjects with the largest hypothetical bias. And yet Table 1.5 shows results
which are similar to but even stronger than those in Table 1.4. When the sample
is restricted to subjects in the 90x treatment, the Task 1 switchpoint is no longer
even a signicant predictor either on its own or in combination with the Task 2
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switchpoint. This result reinforces the core argument of this paper, since it implies
that the hypothetical predictor is superior to the real predictor in spite of the clear
presence of hypothetical bias in the data.
1.3.4 The (un)importance of chronology
One possible objection to the above result is that Task 2 was a better predictor than
Task 1 merely for chronological reasons. Task 1 always came before Task 2, and
perhaps subjects got used to the game and so the Task 2 switchpoints are more
reliable and are a better predictor for that reason. One way to test this is to compare
Task 1 and Task 2 switchpoints as predictors for the switchpoint on Task 4. If Task
2 was a superior predictor of Task 3 behavior only because Task 2 was later than
Task 1, then Task 2 should also be a superior predictor of Task 4. If, however, the
similarity of tasks is more important than chronology, then we would expect that
the Task 1 switchpoint would be a better predictor of the Task 4 switchpoint.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 replicate the structure of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 (respectively)
but with the Task 4 switchpoint replacing the Task 3 switchpoint as the dependent
variable. Contrary to the mere chronology hypothesis, the patterns in Tables 1.6
and 1.7 are exactly reversed from Tables 1.4 and 1.5. In Table 1.6 we see that the
Task 1 switchpoint is a better predictor of the Task 4 switchpoint, and that this is
true both singly (comparing Models 1 and 2, we see partial correlations of .61 vs .51
and R-squareds of .38 vs .27) and in combination (Model 3 shows partial correlations
of .47 vs .25). Unlike the case above, the test of the null hypothesis that Task 1 is a
better predictor is not rejected (the p-value is .93). Table 1.7 shows that the results
in Table 1.6 are preserved when we restrict our sample to the subjects in the 90x
treatment.
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1.3.5 Changing the variable from switchpoints to safe choices
As a check on the robustness of the above results, tables 1.8-1.11 repeat (respectively)
all of the tests in tables 1.4-1.7 but with the total number of safe choices for each
subject replacing the switchpoint as the variable of interest (recall from above that
these should be equal for well-behaved decision makers). Happily, the signs and
relative magnitudes of the coecients are identical under the both variations (this
was probably inevitable given the high correlation between switchpoints and safe
choices, but it is reassuring nonetheless).
1.4 Discussion
The main nding of this paper is that choices on Task 2 (big-stakes, hypothetical)
were a better predictor of choices on Task 3 (big-stakes, real money) than were
choices on Task 1 (small-stakes, real money), suggesting that it is more important
for payos to be of the appropriate scale than for them to be backed by hard cash.
This result holds in spite of the presence of hypothetical bias, and does not appear
attributable to the sequencing of the experiment.
This result, of course, is subject to all of the standard external validity criticisms.
The present data concern only one method for risk elicitation (albeit a very popu-
lar one), and the participants were mainly university students. One would like to
see replications of the result before believing too strongly that hypothetical payos
dominate real money payos in all predictive applications.
But one can be more condent believing that at least hypothetical payos are
not signicantly worse than real money payos for making predictions. Given the
much lower costs of administering hypothetical questions, this suggests that they
deserve wide use among researchers who are more interested in the rank order of
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their subjects' risk preferences than the average value in the population.
Summing up, there are three closely related takeaway messages from this paper.
First: when evaluating the usefulness of hypothetical payos, it is important to dis-
tinguish between calibration (of averages) and prediction (of rank order). Second:
for predictive purposes, hypothetical payos of the appropriate scale appear some-
what better than real payos on a small scale, hypothetical bias notwithstanding.
Third: given this evidence and the cheapness of administering them, hypothetical
choices deserve wider use (i.e. Kahneman and Tversky had it right).
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Table 1.2: The Four Holt & Laury tasks
Hypothetical? Scale of payos (relative to Table 1.1)
Task 1 No 1x
Task 2 Yes 20x, 50x, or 90x (depending on treatment)
Task 3 No 20x, 50x, or 90x (same as Task 2)
Task 4 No 1x
Note: there were 130 subjects; 93 in the 20x treatment, 19 in the 50x
treatment, and 18 in the 90x treatment.
Table 1.3: Mean Safe Choices Before Switching to Risky, by Treatment
All 20x 50x 90x
Task 1 (small, real) 4.9 (1.6) 4.8 (1.6) 4.9 (1.5) 5.1 (1.3)
Task 2 (big, hyp) 4.8 (1.8) 4.8 (1.9) 4.6 (1.8) 5.0 (1.7)
Task 3 (big, real) 6.1 (1.9) 5.7 (1.9) 6.6 (1.2) 7.2 (1.7)
Task 4 (small, real) 5.2 (1.4) 5.1 (1.4) 5.3 (1.2) 5.4 (1.3)
n 130 93 19 18
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
32















Dummies for treatment yes yes yes
R-squared .26 .39 .41
Note: n=130. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=4.42, p=0.02.















R-squared .15 .54 .58
Note: n=18. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=3.41, p=0.04.
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Dummies for treatment yes yes yes
R-squared .38 .27 .42
Note: n=130. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=2.25, p=0.93.















R-squared .41 .12 .47
Note: n=18. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=1.27, p=0.86.
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Dummies for treatment yes yes yes
R-squared .23 .33 .36
Note: n=130. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=2.4, p=0.06.















R-squared .04 .34 .37
Note: n=18. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=1.81, p=0.10.
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Dummies for treatment yes yes yes
R-squared .36 .26 .42
Note: n=130. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=1.7, p=0.90.















R-squared .39 .16 .51
Note: n=18. Coecients are standardized as partial correlations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.05, *** denotes p<.01.
The one-sided null that 1>2 in Model 3 has F=0.85, p=0.81.
36
Bibliography
[1] Anderson, L., Mellor, J., (2009). Are risk preferences stable? Compar-
ing an experimental measure with a validated survey-based measure,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 39, 137-160
[2] Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moatt, P., Starmer, C., & Sug-
den, R. (2010). Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[3] Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E. E. (2008). Experimental Evidence
on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods.
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Vol. 1, pp. 752-767).
Elsevier.
[4] Harrison, Glenn W. (2007), Hypothetical Bias Over Uncertain Out-
comes, in Using Experimental Methods in Environmental and Resource
Economics, John A. List, ed., Northampton, MA: Elgar.
[5] Holt, C.A., Laury, S.K., (2002). Risk aversion and incentive eects,
The American Economic Review 92(5), 16441655.
[6] Guiso, L., Paiella, M., (2005). The Role of Risk Aversion in Predicting
Individual Behavior, Bank of Italy, Working Paper No. 546.
37
[7] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
doi:10.2307/1914185
[8] Laury, S.K., & Holt, C.A. (2008). Payo Scale Eects and Risk Pref-
erence Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions, in Handbook of Ex-
perimental Economics Results, Vol. 1, pp. 1047-1053. Elsevier.
38
Chapter 2
Personality accounts for stable
preferences and expectations across a
range of simple games1
Behaviour in even simple experimental games shows considerable individual dif-
ferences; but previous attempts to link these preferences to stable personality traits
have had mixed results. Here we address three limitations of earlier empirical studies,
namely: 1) uncertainties concerning the reliability of preferences over time; 2) use
of limited bandwidth personality instruments; and 3) confounds where more than
one psychological motive can lead to a particular choice. Sixty-seven participants
completed 18 distinct real-money games twice over a two-week interval along with 6
measures concerning their expectations about other players' choices. Personality was
measured using the full NEO-PI-R. Choices were highly stable across time (r = .84).
1Note: this chapter expands upon a paper with the same title which was recently published in
Personality and Individual Dierences. The original paper was coauthored with Gary Lewis and
Timothy Bates from Edinburgh University's psychology department. See: http://www.sciencedi-
rect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886911003321
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Moreover, choices on the 12 games and 6 expectations reected a single underlying
dimension of prosocial orientation, measuring concern for the payos received by
other players. Scores on the prosocial orientation dimension were related to person-
ality, with openness, (low) neuroticism, and (low) extraversion retained as signicant
predictors. Based on these results, we suggest slight modications to existing theo-
retical models of social preferences to incorporate individual dierences in a manner
which is both parsimonious and empirically valid.
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2.1 Introduction
When playing a dictator game, some people are more generous than others. Within
experimental economics more generally, there is individual variation in behaviour
in almost all games, particularly those involving social preferences (Camerer, 2003,
is full of examples). Yet there has been comparatively little investigation into the
empirical basis for, or the structure of, this individual variation.
Here we will describe an experiment which explores individual variation in social
preferences. Sixty-seven subjects played a diverse range of simple games twice over
a two-week interval, and we found that the majority of variation in subjects' choices
was explained by a stable one-dimensional parameter, and that the social prefer-
ence parameter was correlated with personality dierences as measured by standard
psychometric tests (as it should besee next section).
2.1.1 Personality and Social Preferences
That psychologists' conceptions of personality should correlate with economists' con-
ceptions of social preferences is best understood in the context of existing personality
research. Personality psychologists have been trying to map personality space us-
ing more-or-less modern techniques since at least the 1930s (Barenbaum & Winter,
2008), and the consensus in the eld is that the maximum number of reliably mea-
sured dimensions is ve or six, and that this number does not rise for dierent
measurement techniques or in dierent societies, cultures or time periods (at least
for time periods as far back as the early 20th century; see Deary, 1996). The ve- or
six-dimensions result places tight restrictions on the sorts of claims about individual
dierences which economists are free to make. Unless an economist can show that
their methods are tapping variation which was previously unmeasured by psycholo-
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gists (which is unlikely, given the very large stock of available personality tests and
the fact that all of them seem to reduce to the same ve or six dimensions), then the
variation is going to be correlated with an existing personality factor. Since social
preferences are generally meant to tap motivations such as spite, envy or kindness,
all of which are well represented in standard personality tests, there are good rea-
sons to think that any stable variation in social preferences will be correlated with
personality (we test this assertion, and nd it to be supported).
But before addressing the issue of whether or not social preferences correlate
with existing measures of personality, we need to settle the question of whether
standard social preference games are tapping stable individual dierences at all.
Consider a simple dictator game in which a subject can either choose a bundle
in which both he (the dictator) and another subject (the recipient) each get ¿6,
or he can choose a bundle in which he gets ¿7, but the recipient only gets ¿2.
Suppose that an experimenter gives this choice to a pool of subjects and nds that
50% of dictators choose the rst bundle, and 50% choose the second bundle (this
actually an example from Table 2.1). What are we to make of this apparent variation
in subjects' social preferences? There are several possible explanations, including:
noise (they chose at random), mood (they got out on the wrong side of bed in the
morning), and personality (they really do have dierent social preferences). (These
possibilities are not totally mutually exclusive, of course.) The noise theory is that
we ended up with half of the subjects making each choice in our dictator game
simply because their choices were random, perhaps because they did not understand
or care about the game. If the noise explanation is right, then the experiment has
essentially no external validity and we cannot infer much of anything useful from
it. But perhaps the noise explanation is wrong and the actual reason our subjects
diered was that their moods diered on the day that they played the gamesubjects
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who were in a good mood made the generous choice, and subjects who were in a
bad mood made the selsh choice. If this mood explanation of the variation is
correct, then the external validity of our experiment is small but nonzero: we can
make inferences about how people in certain states of mind will respond to certain
stimuli, but we cannot, for example, classify subjects themselves as being selsh or
altruistic, since their behaviour is only due to a transient mood. But perhaps the
mood explanation is also false; perhaps the variation in choices is due to persistent
personality dierences rather than just moods. Some subjects may be generally more
altruistic than others, and the altruistic subjects may be more inclined to choose the
bundle where both players get ¿6. This personality-based explanation is the one
that experimentalists are rooting for (if only implicitly), since it is only when choices
result from stable character traits that we can make interesting generalisations from
the data. This issue matters, because it sets limits to the problems that can be
addressed by experimental economics research.
So how can we tell which of the noise, mood, or personality explanations of choice
variability is correct? We certainly cannot tell from looking at choices on a single
game in isolation, since individual variation would be compatible with any of the
three explanations. But if we gave subjects a group of related (but not identical)
games, then we could at least decide whether or not the noise explanation was
correct. If there is logical consistency in the way that subjects behave across similar
games, then their choices are not pure noise . But we cannot distinguish between
the mood and the personality explanations unless we take measurements at dierent
points in time. If subjects' play is consistent within sessions and over time, then it
is reasonable to conclude that it is explained by a stable personality trait, but if it is
only consistent within sessions but not over time, then it is likely due to an unstable
characteristic such as mood. Summing up, we can distinguish between the noise,
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mood and personality explanations by taking repeated measurements with a closely
related family of games.
The procedure described in the preceding paragraph is basic practice within the
psychology of individual dierences (for an overview, see Part I of Matthews, Deary
and Whiteman, 2009), but it is comparatively uncommon in experimental economics.
Here we attempt to redress this by examining the structure of individual dierences
in social preferences within a popular set of simple dictator games developed by
Charness and Rabin (2002). Our subjects played twelve of Charness and Rabin's
games in each of two sessions spaced two weeks apart, as well as completing a per-
sonality test. This allowed us to test whether social preferences exhibit the stability
that we would hope for and, if so, whether the social preferences are correlated with
other, well established measures of individual dierences.
2.1.2 A Brief Review of Related Literature
It is worth noting at this point that even though there have been, to our knowledge,
no previous tests of the stability of social preferences over time, there have been
numerous papers on the relationship between choices in games and personality as
measured by standard tests, and these papers have found a variety of (sometimes
contradictory) relationships (discussed below). A reader might object here that a
simple check of correlations between choices in games and the results of a personality
test would be a simpler way than the procedure outlined above to test the stability
of game choices: if choices correlate signicantly with personality, then they must
be due to personality traits, and if not, not. But there are several problems with
this method. Firstly, there is the Type I error problem: checking correlations be-
tween a single dependent variable and ve personality factors will yield at least one
statistically signicant relationship roughly 23% of the time even if there is no real
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relationship at all (0.23 = 1 − (.95)5; this is assuming a 5% size of the test). This
is bad, but the number gets even bigger if we make further adjustments for the fact
that the experimenter might be able to choose between several left-hand-side vari-
ables ex post, and the additional fact that the publication process is designed to
report statistically signicant results. Taking these facts together, it is clear that we
would expect to nd at least some published, statistically signicant relationships
between personality and choices in games even if there was no true relationship.
Furthermore, if the null result were true, then we would expect to nd contradictory
results in the literature (because the coecients would be random), and this is not
totally dierent from what we do nd (see below). So if we want to know whether
a behaviour is meaningfully stable, it is not enough just to check for a correlation
with the results of a personality test.
So what is the evidence? As noted above, the results are not always the same.
Hirsh and Peterson (2009) found that the withdrawal aspect of neuroticism (tapping
fear and insecurity) and the enthusiasm aspect of extraversion (tapping positive aect
and sociability) from the Big Five aspect scale (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007)
independently predicted a greater likelihood of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma
game (correlations of −.14, and −.12, respectively). The prisoners' dilemma ar-
guably contains strategic as well as social preference aspects (depending on players'
preferences, they may regard it as a coordination game), which further complicates
interpretation of the results. By contrast, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, and Walkowitz
(2011) found that low neuroticism and high openness predicted more cooperation in
a prisoners' dilemma. Using dictator games, Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004)
reported signicant associations between agreeableness and (low) extraversion and
the sum oered by the dictator in a dictator game. Finally, Kurzban and Houser
(2001) reported non-signicant associations between Big Five personality traits and
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behaviour in a public goods game. Further studies have examined variation in so-
cial preferences using personality frameworks other than the ve-factor model. For
example, Boone, De Brabander, and van Witteloostuijn (1999) observed that the
personality traits locus of control, self-monitoring, and sensation seeking had signif-
icant associations (r = .28− .44) with levels of cooperative behaviour in a prisoners'
dilemma game. Scheres and Sanfey (2006) observed signicant associations between
BAS-Drive and BAS-Reward and (low) oers in dictator games. And Swope, Cadi-
gan, Schmitt, and Shupp (2008) reported no signicant eects of the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator on social preferences (participants either played prisoners' dilemmas
or dictator, ultimatum, or trust games).
These mixed results in studies using the ve-factor framework, alongside results
from studies using dierent personality measures, which are not directly compara-
ble, suggest that, while social preferences may be correlated with personality, more
research is required. In particular, research addressing limitations of earlier studies
will be critical to understanding the role of personality on social preferences.
2.1.3 The Current Study
There are a number of possible explanations for the mixed results described above.
Firstly and most straightforwardly, research has seldom addressed the reliability of
social preferences. In fact, to our knowledge, no research has addressed stability in
social preferences across experimental sessions. If reliability in choice behaviour is low
(e.g. because the noise explanation is correct and participants choose randomly), this
would explain both the high variability typically seen in games and the inconsistency
of measured relationships with stable personality traits in previous research, as noted
above.
Secondly, often the personality instruments used in studies associating social
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preferences and personality have lacked comprehensive scope. For example, Swope,
Cadigan, Schmitt, and Shupp (2008) used the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and
Boone, De Brabander, and van Witteloostuijn (1999) used an assortment of scales:
locus of control, self-monitoring, type-A behaviour, and sensation-seeking. While
each of these measures may tap specic traits, the core ve-factor model has demon-
strated broader coverage of stable human behaviour than any other measurement
instrument (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1993), and so provides a more
comprehensive tool by which to understand putative trait inuences on social pref-
erences. To address these limitations, in the present study we measured social pref-
erence twice over a two-week interval, and utilised the full-spectrum 240 question
NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) in order to gain a comprehensive assessment of
personality.
Thirdly, at a more basic level, much research has focused on just one or two
experimental games, such as the dictator and ultimatum games; however, impor-
tant confounds have been identied in these games which render choices ambiguous
as to underlying motivations or preferences (Charness & Rabin, 2002). For exam-
ple, rejection of a low oer in the ultimatum game can reect dierence aversion
or retaliation. These distinct motives, in turn, confound potential underlying per-
sonality traits, such as neuroticism and agreeableness, respectively. Likewise, in the
prisoners' dilemma, a choice to defect can reect aversion to dierential outcomes,
aversion to risk, or a self-regarding preference. These confounds can be mitigated by
exploring a range of payo pairings, varying absolute and relative payo dierences,
as well as allowing multi-stage games (Charness & Rabin, 2002). Finally, and im-
portantly, choices reect expectations about the other player in addition to personal
preferences. An example would be the expectation (or fear) that the other player
will defect. Because of these confounds in single games, personality is likely to have
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apparently divergent or null associations to preferences on dierent games because of
the distinct ways in which each game might trigger personality-related preferences.
Here we have used a set of games which are well-established in the experimental
economics literature (Charness & Rabin, 2002). By using a mixture of games, we
can eliminate common confounds between Pareto-damaging behaviour, retaliation,
and inequality reduction. These games also tap into the two primary factors which
economic theorists have identied as critical for explaining social preferences: How
much the other participants receive (comparison-based preferences; people will be less
kind towards those who have more than themselves), and the perceived intentions of
the other participants (intention-based preferences; people will be less kind towards
those who have shown bad intentions). These factors have been separately identied
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin
(2002; see also Daruvala, 2010, for a review), but have so far only been discussed
in terms of their inuence on average behaviour; the factor structure of these games
has not yet (to our knowledge) been examined.
2.1.4 The Prosocial Orientation Scale
We nd that choices across the full range of games are positively correlatedsubjects
who made the social surplus maximising choice in any one game were more likely to
make the social surplus maximising choice in another game. We use this result to
propose a new measure of social preferences which we deem the Prosocial Oreintation
Scale. An individual's POS score is calculated by simply aggregating their choices
and expectations from multiple games into a single scale, which we found to be
signicantly correlated with personality as measured on the NEO personality test.
The measure is a simple tool which can be adapted by future researchers to control




Seventy-ve participants were recruited from an undergraduate participation pool:
Participants received partial course credit for attending as well as a nancial remuner-
ation based on choices made in the experimental tasks. Of the initial 75 participants,
71 returned for the second session. A further four participants' data were lost due
to a data storage failure. Of the 67 remaining participants, 54 were female (mean
age = 19; SD = 3.9 years).
2.2.2 Measures
2.2.2.1 Personality
Five-factor model (FFM) personality traits were measured using the 240-item NEO-
PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants completed the inventory at individual
computer terminals, selecting, for each statement contained in the test, one of the re-
sponse options: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree or strongly agree.
These individual responses were coded as 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 and aggregated into scores
on the personality domains by summing up positivly keyed items and subtracting
negatively keyed ones (e.g. for Extraversion, responses to questions like I laugh
easily would be added to the Extraversion total score, while responses to questions
like I usually prefer to do things alone would be subtracted).
2.2.2.2 Games
A set of six dictator and six response games (described below) were taken from
Charness and Rabin (2002) and are named according to their convention (with the
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exception of Ed 128, which is derived from Berk 28 but was not in the original set
of games). As an example of comparison-based preferences, in the game known as
Berk 23 (see Figure 2.1), Player B chooses between an outcome in which Player A
gets ¿8 and Player B gets ¿2, versus an outcome in which each receives ¿0. As an
example of an intention-based preference, in the game known as Berk 22 (see Figure
2.2), Player A can choose ¿3.75 for themselves and ¿10 for Player B, or let Player B
choose between ¿4 for each player or ¿2.50 for Player A and ¿3.50 for themselves.
Here, if Player A `enters' the game and allows Player B to make the choice, Player
A deprives Player B of a guaranteed ¿10. Of course, Player B may now choose
the lower payo for themselves (¿3.50 rather than ¿4) in order to punish Player A
(Player A would then receive ¿2.50 rather than ¿4). Participants played all response
games both as Player B and as Player A.
Games are listed in Table 2.1 corresponding to the (xed) order that they were
played by the participants. Games are presented so that the prosocial choice for
Player B is always on the left (although the games were counter-balanced when
presented to the participants), with the exception of Berk 26, in which the total
payo is identical for both choices available to Player B.
In order to explore the role of players' expectations about the behaviour of others
on their own choices, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of all other
participants who would make the prosocial choice when acting as Player B in the
relevant games. This was taken after they had made their choice in the role of Player
A in the response games. Participants were informed that there would be a ¿10 prize
for the participant with the most accurate estimates of other players' behaviour.
Participants were tested individually in separate experimental cubicles. Partici-
pants were informed both when they signed up for the experiment and again at the
beginning of their rst session that they would be required to return for the second
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Figure 2.1: Screenshot of Berk 23
Note: This shows a screenshot of one of the dictator games as presented to sub-
jects. Subjects had previously been told that 200 and 800 translate to ¿2 and ¿8,
respectively, and that their responses would be treated anonymously.
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Figure 2.2: Screenshot of Berk 22A
Note: This shows a screenshot of one of the dictator games as presented to subjects.
Subjects had previously been told that 375=¿3.75, 1000=¿10.00, etc., and that their
responses would be treated anonymously.
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Table 2.1: Game payos and the proportions of participants making each choice
Out Enter Left Right
Dictator Games
Berk 17 B chooses (750,375) vs. (400,400) .16 .84
Berk 23 B chooses (800,200) vs. (0,0) .67 .33
Berk 29 B chooses (750,400) vs. (400,400) .38 .62
Berk 15 B chooses (600,600) vs. (200,700) .50 .50
Berk 26 B chooses (400,400) vs. (0,800) .35 .65
Ed 128 B chooses (125,125) vs. (75,125) .72 .28
Response Games
Berk 13 A chooses (550,550) or lets .86 .14
B choose (750,375) vs. (400,400) .16 .84
Expectations of B .19 .81
Berk 30 A chooses (400,1200) or lets .49 .51
B choose (400,200) vs. (0,0) .70 .30
Expectations of B .65 .35
Berk 31 A chooses (750,750) or lets .78 .22
B choose (800,200) vs. (0,0) .57 .43
Expectations of B .57 .43
Berk 19 A chooses (700,200) or lets .75 .25
B choose (600,600) vs. (200,700) .46 .54
Expectations of B .29 .71
Berk 22 A chooses (375,1000) or lets .31 .69
B choose (400,400) vs. (250,350) .80 .20
Expectations of B .80 .20
Berk 28 A chooses (100,1000) or lets .31 .69
B choose (125,125) vs. (75,125) .65 .35
Expectations of B .41 .59
Note: Numbers in parentheses show (Player A, Player B) payos in British pence;
Out = The proportion of Player Bs who opted to stay `out' of the game by choosing
the available payos and thus depriving Player A of making a choice; Enter = The
proportion of Player Bs who `entered' the game, thus allowing Player A to make a
choice between the available payos; Left = The proportion of participants choosing
the payos to the left; Right = The proportion of participants choosing the payos
to the right; Expectations of B = Player A's expectations of the average B choice.
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half of the experiment in two weeks in order to obtain both course credit and mon-
etary payment. Participants were paid at the end of the second session based on
their rewards in one task from each of the two sessions chosen at random and this
was common knowledge.
Participants rst played all six dictator games before playing all six response
games as the second player and nally playing the same six response games as the
rst player (see Table 2.1). Participants were told that payos would be based on
converting winnings from one game at random in each session into British pence (i.e.
750 = ¿7.50). Participants were not told of their partners' choices until the end of
the second session, when they were paid. The NEO-PI-R was administered in two
blocks: one at the end of the rst session and one at the end of the second session.
2.3 Results
The proportions of choices made by participants for each game and the expectations
of other players' behaviour are summarised in Table 2.1.
2.3.1 Factor structure of social preferences
It is unwise to attempt to correlate personality with decisions in individual games:
single decisions contain too much noise. Instead we follow the logic of personality
test construction: noise reduction through aggregation. Thus we initially examined
our data to see if there was a case for summing behaviour into scales before assess-
ing behavioural stability across sessions and the relationship with personality. To
preview the conclusion: we found that there was a strong case for aggregation, and
so we used our data to construct a single prosocial orientation scale (POS).
Within the dictator games, there are theoretical reasons for splitting the games
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into categories, as described above. If participants have comparison-based prefer-
ences (i.e. if they care whether the other participants have more or less than them),
then Ed128B, Berk15B, and Berk26B might elicit dierent behaviours than Berk29B,
Berk17B and Berk23B, since the rst three games represent situations where the de-
ciding participant has either the same as or less than the recipient, whereas the nal
three games represent situations where the deciding participant has either the same
as or more than the recipient. Similarly, if the participants have intention-based
preferences, then we may observe yet dierent patterns of behaviour in games such
as Berk30B or Berk31B, since the participant in role B may feel wronged by the
participant in role A. Finally, we should allow for the possibility that participants'
expectations about each other's choices will have a relationship with personality
which is independent of the relationship with their own choices.
The surprising result is that choices all of these items turn out to be strongly
intercorrelated. A correlation matrix constructed from all of the dictator games as
well as expectations and responses for both A- and B-players in the response games
shows that all items are positively intercorrelated. Indeed, a factor analysis of the
data reveals that the rst factor accounts for 58% of the variance, and a scree plot
shows that the eigenvalues (10.9, 3.0, 2.2, 0.8, 0.7, . . .) drop o very rapidly after
the initial value. That rst factor has positive loadings on all 24 variables. Thus
we were persuaded to construct a single scale by averaging across all 18 roles in
the 12 games as well as the 6 sets of expectations for use in subsequent analyses.
To construct the scale, we coded all choices such that larger numbers correspond
to greater total payo (i.e. greater social surplus). For decision tasks, the social
surplus maximising choice (e.g. choosing left in any of the response games) would
count as 1, whereas the socially inecient choice would count as 0. For expectations,
the expected proportion of other subjects who make the surplus maximising choice
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represents the score (e.g. expecting 78% of responders to go left in a response game
corresponds to a value of 0.78). A subject's score on the overall scale was a simple
average of the 24 scores on the individual items. Thus the prosocial orientation scale
(POS) represents the average proportion of social surplus maximising decisions that








Here, i denotes an individual and k is the number of games played plus the number
of expectations elicited. If the m-th item was a game, then xm = 1 if individual i
made the prosocial choice on that game and xm = 0 if the individual failed to make
the prosocial choice. If xm was an expectation, then xm takes on a value between
zero and one, where the value corresponds to the proportion of the population which
player i expected to make the prosocial choice on the relevant game.
2.3.2 The PO Scale: reliability
The PO Scale demonstrates good reliability (Cronbach's α = .94), as do subscales
composed of choices in the six dictator games (Cronbach's α = .78), the six A
response games (Cronbach's α = .74), the six B response games (Cronbach's α =
.86), and the six sets of expectations (Cronbach's α = .94). Furthermore, since
we have data spanning a two week period, we can also test the session-to-session
stability of the prosocial orientation scale by calculating each subject's POS score in
each of the weeks and checking the session-to- session correlation. When we do this,
we obtain a correlation of 0.84 (t = 12.6, p < .0001), indicating good stability.
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2.3.3 Personality as a Predictor of Prosocial Orientation
Having established that social preferences demonstrated high reliability and stabil-
ity, we next examined the relationship of FFM traits to social preferences using
linear modelling (multiple regression) with POS scores as the dependent variable
and entering each of the FFM domains (as well as age and sex) as independent vari-
ables. This model accounted for 25.5% of variance in POS scores, with neuroticism
(β = −.33, p = .02), extraversion (β = −.32, p = .02), and openness to experience
(β = .41, p = .003) being signicant predictors (see Table 2.2). Agreeableness,
conscientiousness, sex, and age were not signicant predictors and removing these
variables did not signicantly alter model t (F = 1.46, p = .23) or the parameter
estimates of the signicant predictors. Pairwise interaction terms for all personality
factors were non-signicant.
As a check on the robustness of our results, we re-calculated the PO scale as the
rst (unrotated) principal component to emerge from a principal components analysis
of the choice and expectation data. Doing so yielded results which were almost
indistinguishable, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from the results presented
above. This is encouraging, as it suggests that our results do not depend very
strongly on the functional form we have chosen.
2.4 Implications for modelling: traits instead of types
The nding that a common factor underpinned choice behaviour across our games is
of considerable theoretical interest because it suggests that variation in social prefer-
ences can be described by a single continuous parameter, even if the underlying model
of social preferences has multiple parameters. This matters, because it suggests that
social preferences can be reconciled with two of the central ndings of personality
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Table 2.2: Personality predictors of the Prosocial Orientation Scale (standardised
coecients are presented) for Model 1 and Model 2








Multiple R2 .26 .18
Note. N = 67; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01
psychologythat personality is continuous, and that it is ve- or six-dimensional.
The fact that personality is continuous implies that individual dierences should be
modeled with trait-based theories rather than type-based theories, and the fact that
personality consists of only about ve dimensions in total suggests the need for par-
simony: theorists cannot use up too many dimensions modelling social preferences,
or they won't have any dimensions left over to model risk attitudes, time prefer-
ences, loss aversion, work ethic, aggression, and so on. Below, I will show how these
constraints can be jointly satised and I will relate the discussion to two popular
models of social preference (Charness and Rabin 2002 and Fehr and Schmidt 1999),
but rst I want to briey expand on the reasoning behind those models.
Economists are often in the habit of classifying subjects as dierent types ac-
cording to the way that they act in laboratory games. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
classify subjects into fair types and selsh types based on their choices in a series of
games, and Charness and Rabin (2002) classify subjects based on similar criteria as
having one of four types of preferences: selsh preferences, competitive preferences,
dierence-averse preferences, or social welfare preferences (these terms will be de-
ned in more detail in section 2.4.1 below). It is not hard to nd other examples of
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this sort of classication in experimental economics papers. But the more valid (and
arguably more intuitive) way to think about individual dierences is that each one
is a trait measured along a continuum. Deary (2009) provides a brief history and
exposition of the trait approach within personality psychology. In our case, the way
to think about the issue is that subjects are not discretely selsh or fair-minded, but
somewhere along a spectrum in between the two.
Economists are also, at least sometimes, in the habit of positing independent pa-
rameters along which individuals may vary without either testing to see if individuals
actually do vary independently along those dimensions, or making reference to the
total dimensionality of the parameter space in which they are theorising. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) are examples of this, but again it
is not dicult to nd others. This approach is not a problem per se, as theorising
generally precedes testing, but the theories must be tested eventually. Particularly,
theory must face up to the "budget constraint" that there cannot be more than ve
or six major parameters describing individual dierences. In this case, we have found
evidence that social preferences in dierent situations co-vary strongly enough that
they can be described as eectively one-dimensional. We denote that dimension by
ψ (henceforth, the reader should think of ψ as a strictly increasing function of POS,
but with the exact nature of the function dependent on the measures used to elicit
POS).In the next section, we will briey show how ψ can be parametrised in various
other-regarding utility functions.
2.4.1 Charness and Rabin (2002)
Consider the linear model of social preferences used by Charness and Rabin (2002).
In that model, players make decisions in order to maximize a utility function con-
taining a weighted average of their own payo (πi) and the payo of the other player
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(πj). In addition to the payo variables, the model includes three parameters: the
weight that player i assigns to player j's payo when i is has a relatively higher payo
(ρ), the weight that player i assigns to player j's payo when i has a relatively lower
payo (σ), and nally a parameter which allows for a change in i's weights when j
has misbehaved somehow (θ).
Ui(πi, πj) = (ρr + σs+ θq)πj + (1− ρr − σs− θq)πi
where
r = 1 if πi > πj and r = 0 otherwise
s = 1 if πi < πj and s = 0 otherwise
q = 1 if A has misbehaved, and q = 0 otherwise
Thus for a dictator game like Berk 15 (where πi ≥ πj), this would simplify to
Ui(πi, πj) = ρπj + (1− ρ)πi
And for a dictator game like Berk 17 (where πi ≤ πj), it would simplify to
Ui(πi, πj) = σπj + (1− σ)πi
If you wanted to model individual dierences using this model, you might have
thought that you would have to index all of the parameters by individual i
Ui(πi, πj) = (ρir + σis+ θiq)πj + (1− ρir − σis− θiq)πi
But, as noted above, the results of the present study suggest that this would be
redundanta version of this model which wished to account for individual dierences
would not need to allow for all parameters to vary across individuals; we would
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instead only have to incorporate one additional parameter (ψi) representing POS
which allowed the other weights to be scaled up or down (large values of ψi correspond
to high scores on the PO scale)
Ui(πi, πj) = (ρ(ψi)r + σ(ψi)s+ θ(ψi)q) πj + (1− ρ(ψi)r − σ(ψi)s− θ(ψi)q) πi
Where the functions ρ(·), σ(·), and θ(·) are the same for everyone, and, in addition
to being weakly increasing, satisfy the following two conditions: (1) θ(ψ) ≥ 0 ∀ψ ∈ R
(i.e. in response to an opponent's misbehaviour, an agent will not increase the weight
placed on the opponent's payo) and (2) ρ(ψ) ≥ σ(ψ) ∀ψ ∈ R (i.e. agents give at
least as much weight to the payos of relatively poor opponents as to relatively rich
opponents). So the equation for Berk 15 now becomes::
Ui (πi, πj) = ρ(ψi)πj + (1− ρ(ψi))πi
And for Berk 17
Ui (πi, πj) = σ(ψi)πj + (1− σ(ψi))πi
This is a much better case from the perspective of modelling than the possible
alternative case in which all weights varied independently. Because it is possible to
model individual dierences with a single parameter ψ, and because the use of this
single parameter can account for as much as 58% of the variation in choice behavior
(as suggested by our factor analysis above), experimentalists in the future will have
much less of an excuse to ignore individual dierences.
It is worth considering what this continuum-oriented perspective means for the
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type-based taxonomy which Charness and Rabin outlined in their paper. Charness
and Rabin posited four types of preferences:
• Competitive preferences (σ < ρ < 0). Players of this type are concerned about
improving their relative position vis-a-vis everyone, and they place a negative
weight on the payos of players who have either more or less than them (i.e.
they are willing to make sacrices to hurt both rich and poor alike, but they'll
make bigger sacrices in order to hurt the rich).
• Dierence averse preferences (σ < 0 < ρ). These types place a positive weight
on the payo of players who have less than them, but a negative weight on the
payo of players who have more than them. The combination of these weights
amounts to dierence aversion of the classic Fehr and Schmidt (1999) type (i.e.
they are willing to make sacrices either to help the poor or to hurt the rich).
• Social-welfare preferences (0 < σ < ρ). These types place a positive weight on
the payo of the other player whether he has a higher or lower payo than the
agent (i.e. they are willing to make sacrices to help both rich and poor, but
they'll make bigger sacrices to help the poor).
• Pure self interest (σ = 0 = ρ). These types place no weight at all on other
players' payos when they make their decisions, acting purely to maximise
their own payo (i.e. they will make sacrices to help no one).
But these types can (almost) be compressed to line up on a continuum. Recall
that ρ′(ψ) ≥ 0, σ′(ψ) ≥ 0 and ρ(ψ) − σ(ψ) ≥ 0 (from condition 2, above). In
words, this just means that a person's generosity-to-the-poor parameter ρi is (weakly)
greater than their generosity-to-the-rich parameter σi and that both parameters are
increasing in ψ Figure 2.3 shows what this might look like. Individuals who are
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Figure 2.3: Types and Continua
Note: The gure compares the four types identied by Charness and Rabin (2002)
to the continuum-based scheme in this paper. The rst three types can easily be t
into a continuum scheme, but the pure self-interest types do not t very well.
characterised by small values of ψi have correspondingly small values of σi and ρi and
thus competitive preferences; this is shown on the top line of Figure 2.3. Individuals
whose values of ψi are somewhat higher end up with dierence averse preferences,
and those who are high enough on the ψ spectrum have positive values of ρi and σi
and thus exhibit social welfare preferences (shown on the third line of Figure 2.3).
The problem with this schema is that it cannot accommodate pure self-interest
(depicted on the fourth line of Figure 2.3). Self interested individuals, unlike typical
members of the population, have no space between the (zero) weights they place on
the payos of rich and poor: ρi − σi = 0 − 0 = 0. By constraining our model of
social preferences as we did above, we remove the possibility of such preferences.
This highlights the tradeo of few parameters and fewer possible types versus more
of both. Since theories of individual dierences must obey the budget constraint
of having only ve or six separate dimensions, and since Charness and Rabin (2002)
nd that pure self-interest is relatively uncommon in their data anyhow, we think it
is best to opt for the more parsimonious choice.
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2.4.2 Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
We can also examine the implications of this result for other models of social prefer-
ences. Consider the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They posit a model of social
preferences where people gain utility from having their payo increased, but lose
utility from having large payo gaps vis-a-vis the other players. Gaps are treated
asymmetrically, howeverit is worse to be behind than to be ahead. In the two-player
case, their model has the following form
Ui(πi, πj) = πi − αimax{πj − πi, 0} − βimax{πi − πj, 0}
Where πi and πj are dened as above and αi represents the disutility which
person i incurs for each unit by which player j's payo exceeds his own, and βi,
represents the disutility which person i incurs for each unit by which his own payo
exceeds player j's. By assumption, βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1. Before considering the
implications of the current result for the Fehr and Schmidt model, we can re-write it
slightly to bring it in line with the Charness and Rabin's dummy variable notation:
Ui(πi, πj) = πi − s · αi(πj − πi)− r · βi(πi − πj)
where r and s are dened as above. In cases where πi ≥ πj (as in Berk 15, noted
above), this simplies to
Ui(πi, πj) = πi − βi(πi − πj)
Ui(πi, πj) = βiπj + (1− βi)πi
And when πi ≤ πj (as in Berk 17, noted above)
64
Ui(πi, πj) = πi − αi(πj − πi)
Ui(πi, πj) = −αiπj + (1 + αi)πi
Now we can see that if we set βi = ρi and αi = −σi, then the Fehr and Schmidt
model is exactly equivalent to the Charness and Rabin model for the two-player case
(with the exceptions that the Fehr and Schmidt model places tighter assumptions
on the signs of α and β than Charness and Rabin, and Fehr and Schmidt implicitly
constrain θ to equal zero). Since the Fehr and Schmidt model is just a constrained
version of the Charness and Rabin model, we should be just as happy to reduce the
scope of individual variation to a single dimension as we were above.
2.5 Discussion
The current study set out to determine whether, rstly, social preferences are stable
over time, secondly, whether personality exerts an inuence on social preferences in
a series of simple games and, nally, how to model individual dierences in social
preferences in a way that is empirically valid.
On the rst point, behavioural stability in choices across sessions was high, sug-
gesting that both choice behaviour and expectations of choice behaviour in our menu
of games is underpinned by a stable trait disposition.
Our data also provide strong evidence that personality traits exert signicant
inuences upon social preferences. Moreover, these personality eects were seen to
inuence a single dimension of behaviour  termed here the Prosocial Orientation
Scale (POS). Openness to experience was a positive predictor of the POS, such that
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higher levels of openness predicted more benevolent behaviour, and expectations of
more benevolent behaviour. Extraversion and neuroticism were negative predictors
of prosocial preferences, such that more introverted and more emotionally stable
individuals were more likely to make benevolent choices, and to expect others to do
the same. These results conrm and extend the ndings of Lönnqvist, Verkasalo
and Walkowitz (2011), who found that high openness and low neuroticism predicted
cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game. These ndings are in tension with some
previous research reporting that high neuroticism relates to more benevolent social
preferences (Hirsh & Peterson, 2009). However, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo and Walkowitz
(2011) note that Hirsh and Peterson (2009) used hypothetical stakes, whereas their
own work showed that the relationship between social preferences and personality
breaks down in the absence of monetary stakes.
The present results run contrary to one of the core hypotheses of the study,
namely that agreeableness would be a positive predictor of prosocial preferences.
This null-result is striking in light of agreeableness being characterised as a trait in-
dexing empathy and concern for social welfare (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001)
and so having intuitive links to benevolent social preferences. While this result is
puzzling, recent work has suggested that (at least) two distinct mechanisms moti-
vate prosocial behaviours: a fairness-based system and a compassion-based system
(Singer & Steinbeis, 2009). As such, it is plausible that the laboratory environ-
ment (participants completed the experiment alone in lab rooms) did not suitably
invoke empathic concern for other participants thus not `activating' the compassion-
based system; a system which is likely to be analogous to agreeableness. Openness,
however, with robust links to liberal political values (McCrae, 1996), may be more
closely aligned to the fairness-based motivational system (Lewis and Bates, 2011),
perhaps explaining the observed association between openness and benevolent social
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preferences.
The nding that a common factor underpinned choice behaviour across our games
is of considerable theoretical interest because it suggests that variation in social pref-
erences can be described by a single parameter. It was noted earlier that social pref-
erence theories generally posit that the weight which agents place on each other's
payos depends on whether those others have a higher or lower payo than the
agent, and also on whether the recipient seems to have good intentions. The model
of behaviour posited in Charness & Rabin (2002), for example, has three distinct
parameters to reect these contingencies. Our analysis suggests that these param-
eters can be collapsed into a single dimension, because the participants who were
most likely to sacrice for those who had a lower payo than themselves were also
the most likely to sacrice for those who had a higher payo, and for those who had
(or hadn't) shown bad intentions.
Specic limitations require mention. Firstly, females were overrepresented in our
sample, as were students. While no sex or age eects were evident, it would be
useful to extend these results to a sample with greater power to detect such eects.
Secondly, our sample size would have had to be at least ten times larger to perform a
full factor analysis at the item level and determine the factor structure with a greater
degree of condence.
In conclusion, the results suggest that dierences in behaviour on simple games
are stable, that they reect a general preference for prosocial outcomes, that they
have a signicant link to personality traits of extraversion, neuroticism, and openness,
and that they can be straighforwardly incorporated into several existing models
of social preference. Future work seeking to identify trait associations with social
preferences is recommended to place less emphasis on confounded games, such as
the prisoners' dilemma and the ultimatum game, and instead make greater use of
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games that avoid such drawbacks. Extensions to our preliminary investigation of the
psychometric structure of social preferences will also be valuable.
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Contrasting the FFM and HEXACO
models of the structure of
personality: A spectral clustering
approach1
While dimensional models of personality are widespread, there is still not uni-
versal agreement on a structural framework. Much of the debate hinges on results
from factor analysis. Here we use the methodology of spectral clustering to test the
structure of personality in a large dataset (n = 20, 993), with a broad bandwidth
measure (300-item version of the IPIP NEO personality questionnaire), and compare
our results to those obtained from factor analytic solutions. Support was found for
ve- and six-cluster solutions, depending on the weight given to weaker relation-
1Note: this chapter expands upon a paper with the same title which was recently submitted
to the Journal of Personality. The original paper was coauthored with Scott Pauls and Dan
Rockmore (both from the mathematics department at Dartmouth College) and Timothy Bates
(from Edinburgh University's psychology department).
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ships between items. Both the ve-cluster and ve-factor solutions mapped onto the
conventional Five Factor Model (FFM) dimensions. A six-factor solution yielded a
sixth factor that was small and hard to interpret. However, the six-cluster analysis
rendered a solution highly similar to the HEXACO model. We suggest that spectral
clustering provides a useful alternative view of personality data, shedding light on
the role of strong and weak item relationships for dierent theoretical models. For
economists interested in modelling individual dierences, the present results imply
that the budget constraint on the number of dimensions that can be modelled has
increased from ve to six, and that models of preferences need not be linear.
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3.1 Introduction
Taxonomy is basic to any science  often being viewed as the "facts" of a eld, for
which theories then compete to account (McCrae & John, 1992). In personality psy-
chology, the end of the 20th century saw the emergence of a broad consensus as to
the structure of personality: ve orthogonal, broad bandwidth domains collectively
known as the Five Factor Model (FFM) (McCrae & Costa, 1997; 2003). The ve
factors (and their meanings) are: Neuroticism (tendency to experience negative emo-
tions like fear, anxiety, depression, etc.), Extraversion (tendency to be outgoing and
experience positive emotions), Openness (preference for art and intellectual endeav-
ours, tendency to be left-leaning politically), Agreeableness (tendency to empathise
and be kind to others) and Conscientiousness (task orientation, ability to carry out
plans).Variants such as the Big Five (emphasizing Intellect over Openness; Goldberg,
1990) have often been seen as opportunities to rene and redene domains within
this space, rather than as fundamental challenges. An actively researched alternative
 the HEXACO model  appears to question the consensus more robustly, suggesting
that personality consists of, not ve, but six factors (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Roughly
speaking, the HEXACO model splits FFM Agreeableness into two factors: Honesty-
Humility and (residual) Agreeableness. Whether HEXACO or the FFM provides
a better t is important for determining the dimensionality of personality, which is
important to anyone interested in creating a good model of individual dierences.
Factor analysis and more recently conrmatory factor analysis (Jöreskog, 1969)
remain the primary techniques for exploring structure in questionnaire data and are
the foundation for the FFM. Conrmatory factor analytic analyses of the FFM have
met with mixed success (Marsh et al, 2010; Gignac, Bates & Jang, 2007), and at-
tempts to use alternatives not based on factor analysis have only recently begun
(Tiliopoulos, Pallier and Coxon, 2010). Here we present the rst application (to our
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knowledge) of spectral clustering (Von Luxburg, 2007) to personality data, analysing
responses to a battery of 300 items selected to represent the dimensions of the Five
Factor Model (Johnson, 2005). Results are computed for both factor analytic and
spectral clustering solutions, and parameters within the spectral clustering opti-
misation are varied in order to contrast dierent theoretical models of personality
structure: HEXACO and the FFM. We rst briey outline spectral clustering, then
introduce its application to personality.
Spectral clustering is one of a family of clustering techniques that shares with
factor analysis the basic objective of creating a low-dimensional representation of
the data. The techniques dier in their specic optimisation targets: while factor
analysis maximises the amount of variance accounted for in a given low-dimensional
projection of the correlation matrix (Spearman 1927, Cattell 1978), spectral cluster-
ing, by contrast, minimises the amount of cutting necessary to divide a geometric
representation of the data into separate clusters, where each cluster can eectively
be viewed as a summary dimension of the underlying data (see e.g., Leibon, Pauls,
Rockmore & Savell, 2008).
An advantage of the spectral clustering approach used here is the inclusion of a
scale parameter, allowing the weight placed on the weakest versus the strongest cor-
relations to be adjusted when performing the optimisation  this is done by varying
the scale parameter. The eect of dierent scaling choices is highlighted in Table
3.1. Correlation matrices for two parcels of three items are depicted, with each item
loading either exclusively the facets of one factor (left panel), or loading strongly on
one domain, but with signicant smaller cross-domain loadings (right-hand panel).
This latter situation is common among items assessing the FFM, such as the NEO-
PI-R (cf: Costa and McCrae, 1992). Graphically, the strongest correlations occur
along the main diagonal blocks, with weaker correlations in the o-diagonal blocks.
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Table 3.1: Schematic presentation of a correlation matrix of items sorted for their
major domain, demonstrating the eect of sigma and of low (left matrix) and high
(right matrix) between-domain correlations in determining the solution obtained in
spectral clustering.
A1 A2 A3 N1 N2 N3 A1 A2 A3 N1 N2 N3
A1 1.0 .7 .6 0 0 0 A1 1.0 .7 .6 .2 .3 .2
A2 .7 1.0 .7 0 0 0 A2 .7 1.0 .7 0 .2 .2
A3 .6 .7 1.0 0 0 0 A3 .6 .7 1.0 .2 .2 0
N1 0 0 0 1.0 .7 .6 N1 .2 0 .2 1.0 .7 .6
N2 0 0 0 .7 1.0 .7 N2 .3 .2 .2 .7 1.0 .7
N3 0 0 0 .6 .7 1.0 N3 .2 .2 0 .6 .7 1.0
Note: In a hypothetical test sampling two major domains (here A and N) with
three items per domain, the largest correlations will occur on the blocks on the main
diagonal, Correlations in the o-diagonal positions may either be negligible (left
matrix) or small to moderate in size (right matrix). In spectral clustering, the scale
parameter sigma determines the weight given to smaller correlations. As these are
mainly to be found o the diagonal blocks in questionnaire data, in psychometric
practice, sigma determines the inuence of items with cross-domain loadings. In the
case where these are negligible, no eect will occur. However when at least some
o-diagonal block correlations are moderate in magnitude, emphasis on the on these
may reveal a dierent structure than the one which emphasized only the strongest
correlations on the block diagonal.
This relationship between the strength and location of correlations emphasises why
the eect of the scale parameter available in spectral clustering (but not in factor
analysis) is of value in interpreting diering theories of personality; If dierent scales
give rise to dierent numbers of clusters this suggests the existence of theoretically
meaningful relationships in the o-diagonal correlations with a structure that is not
apparent when only the strongest correlations are considered. Equally, if these o-
diagonal associations represent primarily sampling error or item-specic correlations,
as would be predicted from the Five Factor Model, then emphasising weaker links
to a greater or lesser degree will not aect the structure that is recovered. Thus
the method aords the possibility, but not the necessity, of discovering additional
meaningful clusters.
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One of the primary advantages of spectral clustering over more traditional tech-
niques is that spectral clustering can detect more general kinds of patterns in the
data. Techniques such as principal components analysis and factor analysis search
for linear relationships in the data, and k-means clustering will optimise only within
convex structures, but spectal clustering can solve very general problems like in-
tertwined spirals (Von Luxburg, 2007). Indeed, much of the early work in spectral
clustering was in image analysis, where traditional techniques often failed to segment
photographs into meaningful chunks (e.g. dog, boy, sky, grass) but where spectral
clustering was able to create more intuitive groupings (Von Luxburg, 2007). A nd-
ing that structures discovered by spectral clustering provide a better t to the data
than those discovered by linear methods such as factor analysis or principal com-
ponents suggests that the underlying structure may be nonlinear; this, in turn, has
implications for the kinds of models which should be used to t the data. These
issues are considered further in the discussion.
Spectral clustering thus provides a method for revealing structure within per-
sonality data which is distinct from that aorded by factor analysis. It can pro-
vide both a robustness check when compared to factor analysis, and, because of
the control it oers over sensitivity to item relationships, can explore the eect of
weaker and stronger sources of variance on models of personality. While we did not
predict that the method would favour of any particular alternative model, we were
aware that Tiliopoulos et al.'s (2010) results using non-metric multidimensional scal-
ing found support for Eysenck's three factor PEN model over Costa and McCrae's
FFM. We thus focused on contrasting the major three-, ve-, and six-domain classes





Subjects completed 300 items from the International Personality Item Pool's (IPIP)
NEO questionnaire, which has been developed to measure the same constructs as the
NEO-PI-R (Goldberg et al., 2006). The test includes ve domain-level constructs:
Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A), and Consci-
entiousness (C). The IPIP NEO also measures six facets per domain. The mean
correlation of facets on the IPIP proxy with corresponding facets in the NEO-PI-R
is 0.94 after correcting for unreliability (Goldberg, 1999).
3.2.2 Participants and procedure
A total of 23,994 subjects participated between August 6, 1999 and March 18, 2000.
Of these, 20,993 submissions were retained after excluding subjects for long strings
of identical or missing responses or for duplicate submissions. Detailed information
about the criteria for excluding responses can be found in Johnson (2005). The
nal sample was 63.1% female and had a mean age of 26.1 years (SD=10.7 years).
Subjects were not actively recruited; they discovered the website either on their own
or through word-of-mouth.
3.3 Results
The statistical procedure used here closely follows the method used in Leibon et al.
(2008), so the reader looking for full details about implementing the procedure is
referred there. Here, we wish to go into enough detail to make clear the role of the
scale parameter, which plays a central role in the results that follow.
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3.3.1 Network construction and the importance of weak con-
nections
We begin by transforming the item correlation matrix into a matrix with a geometric
interpretation (and thus no negative values). First, the correlations between items i






This returns a dissimilarity matrix where distances are larger for dissimilar items
(with respect to correlation). This is transformed to a similarity matrix, to use as





The parameter σ is the scale parameter  it determines how wide the Gaussian is.
The eect of this is to specify how small the distances must be to create a strong edge
in the resulting adjacency matrix. Edge strengths range between 1 (the strongest
edge) and 0 (absence of an edge). When dij is much smaller than σ, then aij lies
close to 1. Conversely if dij is much larger than σ, then aij is close to 0. Figure 3.1
shows, on the left, the histograms of entries of aij for three dierent choices of σ. On
the right, we show images of the A matrices themselves  darker colours are close
to 0 while lighter colours are closer to 1. Thus smaller σ creates smaller aij while
larger σ creates larger aij. Intuitively, when small values of σ are used, the network
is dominated by a small number of the strongest connections, but as larger values
of σ are used, the weaker connections become increasingly important in determining
the shape of the resulting network.
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Figure 3.1: The eect of changing the scale parameter σ.
Note: The histograms at left show the histograms of the adjacencies aij for our data
as σ increases from 0.4 to 0.5 to 0.75. Notice that the adjacencies spread as the scale
parameter increases. The matrices at right are images of the 300 × 300 adjacency
matrices of question responses; lighter colours indicate more similar items. Note that
the questions have been sorted so that all 60 Neuroticism questions come before all
60 Extraversion questions, and so on in the order N, E, O, A, C. Thus the block
diagonal appearance of the matrices indicates the tight within-factor relationships.
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3.3.2 Spectral clustering algorithm
Spectral clustering relies on an analysis of the spectral data (eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors) of the Laplacian. We form the symmetrised graph Laplacian from the ad-
jacency matrix A,











The optimisation problem for the weighted network encoded in A is to nd a
decomposition of the nodes of the network into disjoint subsets A1,. . . ,Ak (for given





where Cut(At) is the total weight of edges from nodes in At out to the rest of
the network and V ol(At) is the sum of the degrees in the nodes of At. As shown by
Shih and Malik (2000) a relaxation of this combinatorial problem turns this into an
eigenvector problem for this symmetrised Laplacian. To accomplish this we proceed
as follows (see Ng, Jordan & Weiss, 2002):
1. Find the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the symmetrised Laplacian. It is possi-
ble to show that the matrix is positive semidenite  i.e., has only nonnegative
eigenvalues. Discard the zero eigenvalues and associated eigenvectors
2. Determine the number of eigenvectors, l
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3. Determine the number of clusters, k
4. Use k-means clustering on the embedding of the nodes into Rl given by the
rst l (undiscarded) eigenvectors
3.3.3 Parameter estimation
As detailed above, the spectral clustering algorithm uses three parameters: the num-
ber of eigenvectors to feed into the clustering algorithm (l), the scale parameter (σ),
and the number of clusters (k). The success of the method depends on picking rea-
sonable values for these parameters. While we approach picking these parameters
sequentially, it is important to realise that all three are intertwined. For example, at
dierent scales, we may nd dierent good choices for l and k. In a sense, we wish
to pick values for these three parameters in conjunction with one another.
3.3.3.1 The number of eigenvectors
In contrast to other spectral methods (such as principal components analysis), the
smaller the eigenvalue of the symmetrised Laplacian, the more important it is. The
zero eigenvalues correspond to the connected components (two nodes are connected
if there is a sequence of nonzero weight links between the nodes, and a connected
component is a maximally connected subnetwork) of the networks, naturally thought
of as the most obvious form of clustering. As the eigenvalues increase (i.e., move
away from zero), they encode a diminishing amount of clustering information. If
the spectrum naturally separates into a clump of eigenvalues near zero and a clump
separate from that, the lower eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors give a
natural dimensionality reduction in the data.
In picking the number of signicant eigenvalue/eigenvector pairs, we use an ad
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hoc method similar in many respects to the scree method used to pick the number
of factors in factor analysis. We rst note that this will depend on the parameter σ
which we vary between 0 and 1. The goal is to look for domains of stability in the
spectrum of the symmetrised Laplacian, as measured by the number of small nonzero
eigenvalues that are well separated from the bulk of the spectrum which generally
tend to cluster around 1. Figure 3.2 shows a plot of the nonzero eigenvalues for a
range of scale parameters σ from 0.35 to 1. We see that for a signicant range of σ,
the rst four eigenvalues are visually separated from the bulk. We note that for σ
less than 0.35, the graph associated with A has more than one connected component,
which is implausible. Thus, we will pick l = 4 and constrain σ to fall in the range
we have considered.
3.3.3.2 The scale parameter
To further estimate σ, we consider the eect of the choice of σ on the optimal
number of clusters. To assess this for a given σ, we use the method of cluster
consistency described as follows. For a xed l and σ, apply k-means repeatedly with
ki ε {2, 3, . . . , kmax} (where kmax is a reasonable choice for the maximum number of
clusters - for this data, we used kmax = 10) to the l-dimensional spectral coordinates.
For a given k, we then use the following procedure to test the consistency of the
clustering with k clusters we have computed above.
1. For each ki, pick 150 questions at random from the total and perform spectral
clustering with l xed and k = ki.
2. Compute the percentage of the 150 questions whose cluster classication diers
from the original clustering.
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Figure 3.2: Eigenvalue spectra for dierent values of the scale parameter σ
Note: Eigenvalues of the symmetrized Laplacians are on the vertical axis, and are
indexed on the horizontal axis. The rst (zero-value) eigenvalue has been omitted in
all cases.
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In general we repeat this many times and compare the distributions of reclassica-
tions for all k to select the most consistent clustering (i.e. the k which has the lowest
proportion of reclassied items). We denote by n the number of times we repeat the
procedure.
In our case, for each σ ε 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 . . . , 1 we use this procedure with l = 4
and computed consistency for k = 2, . . . , 10 with 100 repetitions of the procedure
above for each k. Figure 3.3 shows the mean of the minimum classication error
percentages for all the trials for a given (σ, k) pair. In the gure, a cell has a star
if it achieves the minimum misclassication error in that row (two stars appear in
a row if the minima are not signicantly dierent from one another). Figure 3.4 is
closely relatedit plots the minimum misclassication error as a function of σ (i.e.
it connects the stars). Figure 3.4 shows that classications become more stable as
σ increases up to a value of about 0.4, at which point it levels o with about 30%
of items being misclassied. This suggests that we should choose a value of σ in the
range 0.4 to 1. Referring back to Figure 3.3, we see that this range appears to be
most consistent for a number of clusterskequal to ve or six. The Discussion
will consider the optimal value of k in more depth.
3.3.3.3 The number of clusters
Last, we wish to x k. This is in some sense the key point of the paper as the number
of clusters is the analogue for the number of factors. As noted above, the optimal k
depends on the value of the scale parameter σ. For reasonable values of σ (above 0.4
for our data), k = 5 or 6 has the lowest classication error for all values of k between
2 and 10, and this holds across a range of values of the scale parameter σ. To check
that these are global and not merely local optima, we repeat the method of cluster
consistency for larger values of k (we test k up to 40) and with more repetitions per
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Figure 3.3: Mean of the minimum classication error percentages for all the trials
for a given pair of k (the number of clusters) and σ (the scale parameter).
Note: Stars indicate the lowest value in a given row (multiple stars are used when the
values are not signicantly dierent from one another). Comparing the columns for
5 and 6 clusters shows that they are optimal at dierent levels of the scale parameter
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Figure 3.4: Minimum classication error percentages as a function of the scale pa-
rameter σ
Note: This graph essentially just connects all of the stars in Figure 3.3. Notice that
the minimum classication error is stable for values of sigma between 0.4 and 1.
Comparing with Figure 3.3, we see that the low end of this stable range suggests ve
clusters, while the high end of the stable range favours six clusters. This suggests
that the number of personality domains is a function of the scale at which we look
at the data.
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k (200, instead of the previous 100). We set l = 4, kmax = 40, n = 200, and σ to
each of 0.4, 0.5 and 0.75. We set kmax to ensure that the largest value of k included
in our tests substantially exceeded the number of postulated facets in the FFM (30).
Figure 3.5 shows the results. In each pane, the horizontal axis shows the values of k
while the vertical shows the percentage of misclassications. Each circle represents
one trial. The solid line is the mean while the dotted lines are the mean plus or
minus one standard deviation. The top, middle and bottom panes show the results
for σ = 0.4, 0.5 and 0.75 respectively. The fact that the misclassication rate rises
and then atlines above k = 6 conrms that our optima are indeed global. Table 3.2
gives the numerical values of misclassication for various k and σ.
While we do not focus here on the facet-level of personality, it is noteworthy
that while Figure 3.5 shows evidence for structure at the domain level (i.e., ve or
six major clusters), there is no indication of facet-level structure within the data.
Particularly, there is no obvious drop in the proportion of reclassied items around
30 clusters, which is what we would have expected if there had been measurable
structure at the facet level.
Two optimal values for k  six and ve emerged at dierent values of σ (above
and below about 0.5, respectively). It should be stressed that both values of k are
valid and both are reected in the data. When more emphasis is put on the strongest
correlations (by choosing a low value of σ) then the ve-cluster solution is preferred,
but when more weight is put on some of the weaker connections (by using a higher
value of σ), then the six-cluster solution is preferred. The issue of which value of k
is preferred overall is considered further in the discussion.
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of questions misclassied
Note: The vertical axis shows the proportion of items which were dierentially clas-
sied by clustering on various randomly chosen 150-item subsets of the original ques-
tionnaire versus clustering based on all 300 questions. The horizontal axis shows the
number of clusters. Each circle is a dierent trial. The solid line represents the mean
misclassication while the dotted lines are plus or minus one standard deviation. The
value of the scale parameter used was 0.4 in the top pane, 0.5 in the middle pane,
and 0.75 at the bottom. The cluster consistency test was run 200 times for each
value of k.
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Table 3.2: Classication error as a function of the scale parameter σ.
 
Classification error when sigma = 0.4 
  Number of clusters 
  k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 
mean misclassification rate 0.48 0.38 0.32 0.37 0.4 
standard error 0.0035 0.0028 0.0024 0.0022 0.0021 
      
Classification error when sigma = 0.5 
  Number of clusters 
  k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 
mean misclassification rate 0.56 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.4 
standard error 0.0022 0.0024 0.0021 0.0021 0.0017 
      
Classification error when sigma = 0.75 
  Number of clusters 
  k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 
mean misclassification rate 0.46 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.33 
standard error 0.0027 0.0028 0.0021 0.0019 0.0016 
 
Note : This table shows the mean and standard error of the proportion of items
which were misclassied for dierent values of σ and k. Each entry is based on
4000 simulations, and so the standard errors are small enough to ensure that all the
dierences within each pane are statistically signicant at all conventional levels.
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3.3.4 Comparison of domains from spectral clustering and
factor analysis
We next compared ve- and six-cluster solutions to ve- and six-factor solutions
obtained using varimax-rotated factor analysis. In each case, the factor solution was
calculated by assigning each item to the factor on which the item has its highest
loading in a varimax rotation. The cluster solution is calculated as the conguration
of item assignments with the lowest sum of squares out of 10,000 runs of the spectral
clustering algorithm described above.
The ve-cluster and ve-factor models were very similar: of the 300 items on
the questionnaire, 286 were assigned identically by the factor and cluster solutions.
Both solutions closely resembled the conventional Five Factor Model domains of
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness.
The six-factor and six-cluster analyses gave sharply contrasting solutions. The
factor analytic sixth factor contained just seven items (4 from facet N4: Self-Consciousness,
and 3 from other facets of Agreeableness and Neuroticism). By contrast, the six-
cluster solution yielded a large - 34 item - sixth cluster. This cluster comprised 18
items originally assigned to Conscientiousness, 15 items originally assigned to Agree-
ableness and a single item originally from Neuroticism. Thus while the sixth factor
is a small nuisance factor with a majority of members from a single facet, the sixth
cluster was large and meaningful.
The sixth cluster is highly similar to the HEXACO Honesty-Humility factor, per-
haps surprisingly so given that we worked from an item bank chosen to model the
NEO-PI-R, which may not adequately sample the four facets of Honesty-Humility
(cf: Ashton & Lee, 2005). That the sixth cluster consisted almost entirely of Agree-
ableness and Conscientiousness items supports Lee and Ashton's observation that
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correlations of their Honesty-Humility factor with FFM domains are primarily with
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Lee & Ashton, 2004). 13 out of the 15 Agree-
ableness items re-assigned to the Honesty-Humility cluster were drawn from the A2
(Morality) and A5 (Modesty) facets of Agreeableness: Individual items re-assigned
to the sixth cluster included Cheat to get ahead  (A2; reversed), Take advantage
of others (A2; reversed), Dislike being the centre of attention (A5), and Seldom
toot my own horn (A5). Of the 18 Conscientiousness items that were reassigned
to the sixth cluster, 9 came from C3 (Dutifulness), which contains items such as
Keep my promises, and Tell the truth, further reinforcing the impression that the
sixth cluster is Honesty-Humility. The lone Neuroticism item reassigned to the sixth
cluster was from N4 (Self-consciousness), Am afraid to draw attention to myself.
The other ve clusters remained similar to the original FFM domains, with no-
table exceptions. Openness lost most of O3 (Emotionality); 4 items went to the Neu-
roticism/Emotionality cluster, namely Experience my emotions intensely, Seldom
get emotional, Am not easily aected by my emotions and Experience very few
emotional highs and lows. In addition, 2 of the O3 items went to the Agreeableness
cluster: Feel others emotions and Don't understand people who get emotional.
O3 items retained by Openness included Enjoy examining myself and life and Try
to understand myself. Another change from the FFM was that Extraversion lost
all 10 items from the facet E4 (Activity Level) to Conscientiousness. E4 includes
items such as Am always busy and Like to take it easy. Extraversion also lost
4 items from E3 (Assertiveness) to Conscientiousness, including Take charge and




The chief results of the present study were fourfold. First, despite its very dier-
ent approach when compared to the algorithm of factor analysis, spectral clustering
yielded a ve-cluster solution highly similar the ve-factor solution from factor anal-
ysis (with both reecting the FFM). Second, spectral clustering yielded a six-cluster
solution corresponding to that of the HEXACO model, not only in having a sixth
cluster, but in the nature of items comprising the sixth cluster, and in the eects
on the remaining 5 clusters representing Extraversion, Neuroticism/Emotionality,
Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. By contrast, factor analysis yielded
a six-factor solution containing a small and hard to interpret sixth factor. Third,
the facets underlying the FFM domains altered in notable ways, refocusing these
traits. Finally, the results highlight the importance of dierentially weighting larger
or smaller correlations amongst items, respectively, in determining whether ve- or
six-domain solutions t best. Spectral clustering, then, may provide useful traction
in resolving questions of the structure of personality.
The nding that whether ve- or six-cluster solutions were preferred depended
on the weighting given to the strongest connections among the data (more weight
favouring a ve-cluster FFM solution, less weight favouring a six-cluster HEXACO
solution) casts light on the distinction between these two competing models for the
structure of personality. There is no necessary reason to prefer one set of weights
(and hence a particular value of the scale parameter sigma) over another, so we do not
claim that the use of spectral clustering can end the dimensionality debate (though
most values of sigma resulted in the six-cluster HEXACO solution). However, the
contribution of this paper is to take this debate in a new direction by showing that
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the dimensionality issue is tightly linked to the issue of the importance of weaker
connections amongst items.
That the ve-cluster model reects the domain structure postulated by the clas-
sic FFM is signicant given the fact that these two statistical techniques  factor
analysis and spectral clustering  are based on dierent transformations of the raw
data, and have dierent optimisation targets. The present results, then, represent
a robustness check on the FFM, which the FFM passes. This nding is in con-
trast with Tiliopoulos et al. (2010), who found support for lower dimensional two-
or three-cluster solutions. These authors used non-metric multidimensional scaling
(NMDS) on facet-level data from 384 subjects' responses on the NEO-PI-R. The
domains they supported were similar to the three factors of Eysenck's PEN model
(Eysenck 1991, 1992). Two potential origins of this dierence in outcome between
the present result and that of Tiliopoulos et al. (2010) may be relevant. Tiliopoulos
et al., constrained by a smaller number of subjects, analysed their data at the facet
level. Here, with 20,993 subjects, we found evidence at the item level for facets load-
ing on multiple domains: O3 for instance contained items that were clustered with
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Openness. These distinct patterns
among items within a facet are confounded in analyses at the facet level. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, in algorithms such as spectral clustering and NMDS
negative and positive correlations are treated asymmetrically, such that a correlation
of minus one is more similar to zero than is plus one. Because Neuroticism items
correlate slightly negatively with items from the other four domains, if Neuroticism
items are not reverse scored, they have an articially high distance from the other
four domains. To illustrate the eect of this transformation, as well as to place our
results in the context of those of Tiliopoulos et al., we performed NMDS on both the
original data set and the reverse-coded set; both NMDS and spectral clustering of
95
the raw data gave evidence for two clusters (Neuroticism and not-Neuroticism)
and somewhat weaker evidence for ve. Taken together, the relatively lower n, conse-
quent need to use facet-level analysis, and, most importantly, reversal of Neuroticism
prior to analysis seem likely to account for the dierences between the present result
and that of Tiliopoulos et al. (2010).
3.4.2 Dierences between the six- and ve-cluster solutions:
Psycological implications
As might be expected for competing models of the same data, the FFM and six-
cluster HEXACO solutions extracted here are similar in many important ways. The
ve shared domains are similar in both solutions. Neuroticism remained almost
unchanged, and near identical to the corresponding FFM dimension. Extraversion
retained most of its items, but lost four items from E3 (Assertiveness) and the entire
Activity Level facet (E4) to Conscientiousness. Extraversion was thus focused on
warm sociability and excitement seeking.
Openness retained most items, including the more intellectual items of facet O3
(Openness to Emotion) such as Try to understand myself , but lost the remaining
content of O3 in meaningful ways to Neuroticism/Emotionality and Agreeableness
(see results section). It thus lost connection to the direct experience of emotion,
including empathy, and was refocused on understanding emotion.
The Agreeableness cluster changed in ways highly consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the HEXACO model (Ashton and Lee, 2005), losing A2 (Morality)
and A5 (Modesty), and thus, together with gaining empathy-related content from
O3, focused more clearly on compliance and pro-sociality. The movement of hostility
items from Neuroticism to Agreeableness as predicted by Ashton and Lee (2007) did
not occur.
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Conscientiousness gained the E3 (Assertiveness) and E4 (Activity Level) items
from Extraversion as noted above, and lost most of C3 (Dutifulness) and C6 (Cau-
tiousness) to Honesty-Humility, thus becoming refocused towards task engagement
and away from integrity, as predicted by Ashton and Lee (2007).
3.4.3 Dierences between the six- and ve-cluster solutions:
Economic implications
What do the results of the present analysis imply for economic modelling? At the
outset, it's worth reiterating a point stressed in chapters one and two of this the-
sis: the central results of personality psychology have yet to be incorporated into
mainstream economic models. Thus any changes to those psychological results will
not have much eect on economics as it has been practised heretofore. But in a
world where the dimensionality of personality is taken as a serious constraint on
economic theory, the present results would allow additional freedom of movement
in two respects. Firstly, moving to the HEXACO from the FFM would allow the
budget constraint on the number of independent parameters which theorists can
propose to be increased from ve to six. Secondly, moving away from linear factor
models and towards (potentially) nonlinear models from spectral clustering would
allow economists greater scope to model both preferences and the relations between
them in nonlinear ways.
3.4.4 Strengths and Weaknesses
Among the strengths of the analyses were the very large sample size, a comprehensive
item battery, the fact that the item pool was chosen to represent the ve- rather than
six-factor domains, the use of multiple methods, and ability to contrast dierent
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parameterised solutions within the spectral clustering solutions. Weaknesses include
reliance on one dataset: While these data are very large, and we were able to recover
and validate solutions using resampling techniques within this parcel of subjects, it
would be valuable to examine the results of spectral clustering in data derived from
other cultures and subject pools, test formats, and, particularly, on the items of the
NEO-PI-R itself. External validation in terms of dierential validity of the ve and
six cluster solutions in genetic or experimental studies would also be valuable.
3.4.5 Summary
To summarise, the results from applying spectral clustering to a personality dataset
were that we were able to recover the ve-factor model despite a very dierent
analytic approach and optimisation target. Large elements of consistency were
found among the ve canonical domains of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness,
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness whether extracted using the traditional factor
analytic approach or spectral clustering. Giving weight to reliable but moderate
eect-size covariance amongst items supported a six-factor HEXACO structure of
personality. The eect of the six-cluster model was to sequester dutifulness, cau-
tiousness, morality and modesty items from Conscientiousness and Agreeableness to
a new Honesty/Humility cluster. Agreeableness, without its elements of immorality
was refocused onto a dimension of compliance versus what Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides
(2009) termed formidability - a willingness to force others to re-calibrate upwards
the weight they assign to your welfare. Assertiveness and activity were shifted from
Extraversion to Conscientiousness, refocusing Conscientiousness on competent, ac-
tive striving, and focussing Extraversion on warm, gregarious excitement seeking
and positive emotion. Additional eects included removing emotion-experiencing
items from O3 to the domain most relevant to the emotion; either Neuroticism or
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Agreeableness. Whether ve- or six-cluster solutions were favoured depended on the
emphasis given to weak relationships; but most solutions favoured the HEXACO
model.
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Chapter 4
Personality as Strategy: The
Evolution of Extraversion
Extraversion, like all personality traits, shows considerable variance within the
population. This paper develops an evolutionary model to account for that diversity.
I suggest that in a general contest framework, when there are costs to randomisation,
then something akin to the extraversion continuum is the inevitable. The basic model
in this paper is a two-player symmetric war of attrition, but it is extended to account
for asymmetries and for multiple players. The model implies that extraverts take
more risks and that there is a U-shaped relationship between extraversion and loss
aversion.
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"Men are born equal but they are also born dierent"
Erich Fromm
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 The evolution of individual dierences
People dier, and their dierent personalities are important because these dierences,
as measured by self report, are correlated with a range of important life outcomes
including educational attainment (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda et al. 1998; van
Eijck and de Graaf, 2004), college grade point average (Almlund, Duckworth, Heck-
man, and Kautz, 2011), the probability of remaining self-employed (Caliendo, Fossen
and Kritikos, 2008), occupational choice (Barrick and Mount 1991; Ham, Junankar
and Wells, 2009), health choices (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006), longevity
(Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner et al. 2007) and criminal activity (John, Caspi, Robins
et al., 1994). But where do personality dierences come from? While personality
dierences have been a major research area on-and-o for nearly a hundred years, it
is only recently that researchers have begun to place the study of personality within
an evolutionary framework. Daniel Nettle (2006) argues that for each of the Big Five
personality factors1 recognized by psychologists, there is some sort of evolutionary
tradeo which maintains variation in the population (see Kanazawa 2011 for a recent
review of this literature).
This paper will outline (to my knowledge) the rst formal model of these trade-
os, generalising from Nettle's (2005) reasoning about the evolution of extraversion.
1The ve are: conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and extraversion (CA-
NOE).
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Broadly, Nettle suggests that increasing extraversion results in greater short-term
mating success, but at greater cost in terms of risk of injury and neglected ospring.
The same tradeo motivates this paper. The model involves players competing for
resources in a war of attrition. Fertility, as always, drives the game's replicator dy-
namics. I discuss three cases: the two-player symmetric, two-player asymmetric, and
n-player symmetric games. The solution to each of these games is an evolutionarily
stable state (ESS) involving a continuum of actions. These games were rst solved in
the 1970s and 1980s (see references below) and so their solutions are not original to
this paper. Instead, the contributions of this paper are: to apply formal evolutionary
game theory to explain the origins of a personality trait, to show that the dierent
versions of the war of attrition can be linked by a single distribution of types and a
single elementary bidding rule, and to derive the implications of this for individual
dierences in both risk aversion and loss aversion.
4.1.2 Strategic interaction and personality dierences
Before getting into details, it is worth briey considering why we should see vari-
ation at all. Why hasn't the population evolved to a common optimum? Why do
personalities dier?
Some characteristics, such as thirst, are conspicuous in their uniformity. We all
seem to feel thirsty in the same way, and for the same sorts of reasons2. It is easy
to imagine why this is the case, since those of our would-be ancestors who were not
thirsty enough died of dehydration, and those who thirsted too much either died of
hyperhydration, or were preyed upon when they exposed themselves too often at the
2McKinley and Johnson (2004) note that "small increases of 1-2% in the eective osmotic pres-
sure of plasma result in stimulation of thirst in mammals." This seems to be a universal trait, and
indeed the relevant brain area, the lamina terminalis, which inuences thirst, is notably monomor-
phic.
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water's edge. It seems only natural that the whole population would evolve to crave
roughly the correct amount of water, and so there should be little diversity among
(healthy) people in this regard.
Yet there are other characteristics, such as ambition, which are remarkably vari-
able across people. Shouldn't there be an ideal amount of ambition, to which the
whole population will evolve? If not, why not? To answer that question, we must
consider the strategic nature of the two situations. Thirst arises in a non-strategic
settingmy need to restore homeostasis is independent of my neighbours' behavior
(as long as water isn't scarce). So in this case, one genotype is pushed to xation; this
is the inevitable result in non-strategic population genetics (see, e.g., Nowak 2006,
Ch6). Ambition, however, usually plays itself out in a strategic gamehow hard you
are willing to ght for dominance may well aect my own willingness to ght. If I
think you're a pushover, then I may challenge you, but if I think you're a hyper-
competitive daredevil, then I won't. There need not be one optimum behaviour,
since pushovers may do well in a world full of daredevils, and daredevils may do well
in a world full of pushovers. What we are likely to see in this daredevil-pushover
game is a population containing some daredevils and some pushovers. This is the
insight from John Maynard Smith's famous hawk-dove game (Maynard Smith, 1974)
in which the unique evolutionarily stable state (ESS) involves both strategies, so that
the population contains some hawks and some doves3. If we use the hawk-dove game





(it is assumed that V−C2 < 0). The mixed strategy ESS occurs when the frequency of hawks is
V
C .
There are two interpretations of the equilibrium: in the polymorphic case, a fraction VC of the
population plays hawk all the time, and a fraction 1− VC plays dove all the time. In themonomorphic
interpretation, all members are the population are the same, and choose their strategies randomly
before each ght, selecting hawk with probability VC . As Gintis (2009) notes, the polymorphic
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as our metaphor for conict, we should not expect to see the population converge
to a single, ideal level of ambitionwe expect diversity. And the hawk-dove game is
a good metaphor for conict, especially once the action space is generalised from a
binary choice to a continuum, at which point it becomes the war of attrition4.
4.1.3 The war of attrition as a metaphor for conict
The war of attrition (described in detail in section 4.3.3 below), supports multiple
interpretations, but here it is taken to represent a competition that our ancestors
got into where there was some resource at stake, and the players had to compete to
see who would get it in such a way that the losers still had to bear some cost from
competing5. The interesting feature of games like this for the purpose of this paper
is that there is no pure strategy equilibrium; the only stable outcome is when players
randomise. This is interesting because it suggests that a fairly general situation which
must have occurred frequently in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (i.e.
ancestors competing in games with non-refundable bids) should have given rise to
behavioural diversity which is a candidate for personality variation.
There is more than one way to get a mixed strategy, though: monomorphism and
polymorphism. The monomorphic equilibrium is symmetric: all players use a mixed
strategy in which all supported actions are played at the equilibrium frequencies.
The polymorphic equilibrium is asymmetric: each player always plays the same ac-
tion, and players' types are distributed according to the equilibrium density function.
equilibrium is more likely in the case where there is a cost to randomizing. This paper assumes the
polymorphic outcome throughout.
Note also that hawk-dove is isomorphic to the game of chicken.
4There are of course other possible sources of individual variation. Penke et al. (2007) notes
that selective neutrality (i.e. evolutionary irrelevance) and mutation-selection balance could also
maintain variation, but that these are not likely to be the relevant forces in this case.
5The war of attrition is like a second-price all-pay auction. As discussed in section 4.3.3 be-
low, the qualitative insights of this paper apply equally to the rst-price all-pay auction, but the
parameters and distributions end up being slightly dierent.
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Throughout this paper I will focus on the polymorphic equilibrium for both empir-
ical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, the polymorphic interpretation is more
consistent with the evidence of behavioural stability cited above, and theoretically,
the polymorphic equilibrium is more likely when there are costs to randomising6.
So when players compete in a contest with non-refundable bids, the result is a
polymorphic equilibrium where the dierent strategic choices can be interpreted as
personality dierences similar to the extraversion continuum. That, in a nutshell, is
the core argument of this paper.
4.1.4 Extraversion as a simple decision rule
After laying out the basic model, it extended to show how the expected variance of
outcomes relates to personality, how asymmetries between contestants can be dealt
with and how the incorporation of multiple players aects the outcome.
Looking at the variance of outcomes allows the derivation of a well-supported
prediction about extraversion (and particularly about the sensation-seeking compo-
nent at the core of extraversion, which is discussed in more detail in the section
4.2): that it is correlated with risk aversion7 (Aluja, García and García, 2003). This
relationship is predicted based on the fact that the players who persistently submit
the highest bids in the contest (i.e. the sensation-seeking extraverts) also end up
with the greatest variance of outcomes.
Introducing asymmetries into the model produces a novel prediction: that there
is a U -shaped relationship between extraversion and loss aversion. Further details
6I am thinking of thinking costs. If all of your opponents are using mental energy to produce
serially-independent randomisations from the appropriate exponential distribution but you just do
the same thing every time, then you will get a better (net) payo on average. If everyone does this,
then the equilibrium is polymorphic.
7As well as the relationship noted in the text, risk aversion has also been found to be positively
related to other personality traits. See Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman and Kautz (2011, table 6)
for an overview.
109
are given in sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7.
Introducing multiple players changes the outcome very little. After each of the
extensions mentioned above, we end up with an equilibrium where players are charac-
terized by a type θ from the exponential probability density function e−θ. A player
i's idiosyncratic value θi represents his personalityhigh values of θ correspond to
extraverts, and low values of θ correspond to introverts. Given their diverse person-
ality types, all agents use the same basic decision rule to choose their level of eort:
θ × (prize value) × (number of opponents). The bidding rule is identical across
games, as well as across types.
Before getting to the model, I will review some of the evidence for the perspective
taken in this paper, beginning with a brief summary of what is known about the
personality trait of extraversion.
4.2 The nature of extraversion
Extraversion is the most widely accepted of the higher order personality traits, and
its formal denition is similar to the popular one: an extraverted person has an out-
ward focusthey are generally more social, lively, assertive, dominant, and oriented
towards sensation than their more introverted fellows (see, e.g., Matthews, Deary,
& Whiteman, 2009). The word itself comes from the Latin extr (outwards) versin-
em (from the verb "to turn"); introversion has a correspondingly inward-turning
etymology.
Nettle (2005) notes that recent evidence supports the view that "extraversion is
a consequence of the strength of response to naturally rewarding stimuli, such as
sex, food, or physical exhilaration. For the extravert, the salience of these rewards
is greater than for the introvert, with the result that extraverts invest more time
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and energy on them". Indeed, he nds that high extraversion scores are positively
correlated with ambition, competitiveness, interest in sex, and yearning for fame, as
well as risk of hospitalization and susceptibility to addiction. Furthermore he notes
that
Increasing extraversion is associated with increasing desire to take
risks, explore new environments, and compete for status. In tandem, it
is associated with seeking varied mating opportunities, including extra-
pair copulations (especially for men) and serial monogamy (for women).
These strategies will respectively increase the number and genetic quality
of ospring. Increasing extraversion thus increases tness by promoting
social dominance and mating success. However, high extraversion lev-
els entail the risk of physical harm and, possibly, reduce investment in
the protection of existing ospring. The dimension can therefore be con-
ceived as a continuum along which dierent tness costs and benets are
traded o.
Lending further support to the view that the dening feature of extraversion is re-
ward sensitivity, Lucas et al. (2000) tested subjects from 39 nations using popular
scales for extraversion, and found that "sensitivity to rewards, rather than sociability,
forms the core of extraversion". Indeed, they nd that "extraverted participants...re-
ported more pleasant aect even when alone". This suggests that all of the other
facets associated with extraversion, such as dominance, self-condence, warmth, and
sociability are simply by-products of the fact that extraverts are more sensitive to
rewards.
Following the Lucas et al. result, I will measure both extraversion and reward
sensitivity with a single parameter θ. High values of θ are associated with increased
sensitivity and greater extraversion, low values of θ correspond to low sensitivity
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to rewards and, consequently, introversion. In equilibrium, the values of θ are gen-
erated by the probability density function e−θ on [0,∞)8. Once the players are
competing, θ is used in the bidding rule for player i bidi = θi × (prize value) ×
(number of opponents). In the asymmetric case, there is also an intermediate step
where the players gauge their roles, but the decision rule is the same.
It is straightforward to see that the bid function reproduces some of the most
salient features of extraversion. Most basically, dierent members of the population
exert more or less eort in social situations depending on their value of θ. Also,
the extent to which the person exhibits extraverted behaviour depends on what's at
stake. When potential gains are larger, all players exert more eort. What makes
one person more extraverted than another, then, is that the more extraverted person
occupies a relatively higher place in the distribution of bids for any given prize value.
But this will not be true in all situations. As you will see in section 4.3.6, asymmetries
can cause even extreme extraverts to behave in ways that look more characteristic
of introverts (and vice versa).
4.3 The model
4.3.1 Resources increase fertility
In any evolutionary game, the prize is tness. The present model uses the simplest
possible fertility function
8It is perhaps worth mentioning that personality traits such as extraversion, when measured,
are usually found to be roughly normally distributed, rather than exponentially distributed as in
this paper. The exponential distribution, however, is merely an artifact of the assumption that cost
increases linearly with time. If the cost function were convex (e.g. (time)2), then the distribution
of types would be more hump-shaped, and hence more normal. See Norman, Taylor, & Robertson
(1977).
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φ(V ) = V
Where φ represents fertility and V represents resources. The function φ(V ) should
not be thought of as representing total fertility, but merely incremental fertility gains
from the resources which are being competed for. Note that while the linear function
is clearly an oversimplication, Maynard Smith (1982) showed that the function can,
without loss of generality, be replaced with any monotonically increasing function.
4.3.2 Standard simplifying assumptions
Before moving on to describe the nature of contests in this model, it is worth dwelling
on a few of the implicit assumptions. This model makes three simplifying assump-
tions which are common in evolutionary models: that contestants are randomly
matched, that they come from an unlimited population, and that they reproduce
asexually.
Contestants are unrelated because personality traits are, in the words of McAdam
(1995) the "psychology of the stranger" and they are not meant to explain the
particulars of intra-familial relations and their eects on inclusive tness.
The assumption of an unlimited population is for expediency only; in this case,
as in many others, the essential conclusions can be reproduced, with minor caveats,
for nite populations. For more about the war of attrition in a nite population, see
Just and Zhu (2004).
The assumption of asexual replication has a two-part justication. Part one is
that it is simpler. Part two of the justication is that it may actually be a virtue
of such a model to consider the sexes separately. In nature, risk attitudes and
personality factors can be dierentially selected for between the sexes; sometimes
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selection pressures can even point in opposite directions, softening the expression of
a trait in one sex while making the same trait more prominent in the opposite sex
9. In humans, for instance, it is widely reported that risk attitudes dier between
men and women (e.g. Powell & Ansic, 1997); such an outcome may well have been
produced if men and women played similar but separate games.
4.3.3 Mechanics of the war of attrition
The contest in this paper is an all-pay auction, which in an evolutionary context is
more realistic than the alternative of refundable bids. All-pay auctions can be rst-
price or second-price; both of these are qualitatively similar in that they have only
mixed strategy equilibria, and so either one would yield a polymorphic population.
In this paper, I focus on the second-price all-pay auction (aka the war of attrition)
but all of the central results of this paper could be replicated qualitatively with a
rst-price auction, however the equilibrium density functions and the range of bids
would be dierent10.
In the symmetric two-player war of attrition, the setup is as follows: players a
and b compete for a prize with a known common value of V , where V represents the
incremental gain to tness from winning the contest. Both players select non-negative
bids x, and the prize is awarded to the player who chooses the higher bid. Both
players pay an amount equal to the loser's bid. From player a's perspective, the
expected value of making his bid xa against player b's bid of xb is given by:
9Nettle (2006) gives the example of the great tit. "Individuals of this species dier on a be-
havioral dimension called exploration, with high scorers being aggressive and bold in exploring the
environment..in years of abundance, there is a strongly negative linear relationship between female
survival and exploration score...For males, the pattern is diametrically opposite."
10There is also one specic advantage of the war of attrition over the rst-price auctiononly the
war of attrition can give rise to Pyrrhic victories, since it is only in the war of attrition that players
sometimes submit bids which exceed the value of the resource (we will see this shortly). When two
players making such bids face one another, we end up with a contest where even the winners lose.




V − xb if xa > xb
−xa if xb > xa
V
2
− xa if xa = xb
The rationale behind this setup is that the contest escalates through the values
from 0 upwards to the losing bid xlow (where xlow ≤ xi ∀i) . The contest ends when
the loser quits, so both players pay xlowthus payos are related to the losing rather
than the winning bid.
Originally, the currency for bids in the war of attrition was conceived to be time
spent waiting in a contest of display or of patience, such as when male dung ies wait
for females on a fresh cow pat (see Parker 1970a,b). The original assumption was
of a linear relationship between time and cost. Later work on the war of attrition
has revealed the game to be much more general, however. Maynard Smith (1982)
shows that this game can be directly applied to any cost function which increases
continuously, whether linearly or otherwise. The costs can be of many kinds, and
are usually described as expenditure of energy.
The symmetric war of attrition has no pure strategy equilibrium. To see why not,
notice that if there was an equilibrium bid value chosen by both players xa = xb = x̂,
then each player would earn E(x̂, x̂) = V
2
− x̂ from playing the game. This amount
is positive so long as x̂ < V
2
. But this cannot be an equilibrium, because each player
has an incentive to deviate and increase his bid. For example, if player a were to bid
xa = x̂ + ε (where ε may be small), then he would earn E(xa, x̂) = V − x̂ which is
larger than V
2
− x̂, and so he would deviate. But this cannot be an equilibrium either,
because b would have an incentive to outbid a by a tiny amount xb = x̂+2ε to earn
E(xb, xa) = V − x̂ − ε (instead of getting E(x̂, xa) = −x̂). And so on. It turns out
that the game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where players choose their
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As stated previously, there are two possible interpretations for this mixed strategy
equilibrium: monomorphic and polymorphic. In the monomorphic interpretation, all
agents are the same and choose their bids randomly from the density function p(x)
each time they play the game. The polymorphic interpretation is that the players
have dierent strategies which average strategy in the population is equal to p(x).
There are an innity of ways to achieve this average, but the simplest is for an
individual agent of type i to always makes the same bid xi, and for the function
p(x) to give the relative frequency of each type in the population. This polymorphic
result is more likely when there is a cost (e.g. a mental cost) to randomizing, and is
consistent with the evidence of consistent behaviour over time which was discussed
in the introduction.
Since participation times are exponentially distributed, a randomly chosen con-
testant has a constant probability δt
V
of dropping out of the contest during any interval
of time (t, t + δt), where δt is small. Since both participants' dropout probabilities
are independently distributed, the chance that either one of them will drop out and
end the game during any interval of time δt is just 2δt
V
. Thus the value of the lower









This shows that this game is not protable on average. The expected cost of par-
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ticipating in the contest is V
2
for each player, so the surplus is completely exhausteda
typical winner will win +V
2
and the typical loser will lose −V
2
. The expected value
of the game is zero.
To be more precise, the expected value of the game is equal to the lower of the
two available prizes. Until now the prize was V for the winner and 0 for the loser.
But if instead the winner received V1 and the loser received V2, where 0 < V2 < V1,
then the incremental gains from participating in the contest would be ∆V = V1−V2,
and the players' bids would be given by an exponential distribution with mean ∆V .
4.3.4 The basic model is a simple decision rule
We can now examine the simplest case of the complete model: the two player sym-
metric version. Recall that we are taking the simple polymorphic interpretation of
this density function derived above, which means that, for a xed prize value, indi-
viduals persistently make the same bid (and their children inherit these values), and
the proportion of the population playing a particular bid xi is given by the density
function as p(xi). Notice, however, that the density of x depends on V , the fertility
value of the contest at hand. Since V will vary over dierent contests, the polymor-
phic equilibrium cannot be the simple one in which a player i always chooses a bid
xi, because the equilibrium density at that bid must be a function of V . Players'
behaviour has to be sensitive to the size of the prize at hand.
The equilibrium of this game will be one in which each player's behaviour is xed
in relation to the rest of the population, but exible with respect to the available
payo. We can characterise the sense in which agents' relative behaviour is xed by
assigning each player i a characteristic private value θi from the simple exponential
distribution e−θ
PROPOSITION A: if players' types are distributed according to the pdf e−θ and if
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each player i bids θiV in a contest for a resource of value V , then the
population will be in equilibrium.
PROOF: It is straightforward to see that the conditions in the proposition hold, then





Notice that this is a departure from standard evolutionary game theory; players
usually have a xed action but here they have a xed decision rule. As noted, the
reason for this departure is to allow the agents sucient exibility to respond to
the changing prize values which they encounter in various contests while keeping
their decision process as simple as possible. The model could of course be simplied
further by assuming that V is constant and assigning agents a xed action, but then
the model would no longer be one of personality.
Naturally, this requires that θ is unobservableif you knew your opponent's θ,
(call it θj) then you would have an incentive to bid either θjV + ε (if θj < 1) or 0
(if θj ≥ 1). The equilibrium holds only in the case where each opponent knows only
that their enemy's type is taken from the density function ψ(θ). It is reasonable to
assume that this information is private, though, because there are no incentives for
truthful signallingeverybody would want to announce that they had θ > 1, and so
no one would be believed.
This basic model demonstrates the central argument of this paper. In social
competitions of an all-pay nature, there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium. For
a polymorphic population, this means that agents who are otherwise identical may
persistently choose dierent eort levels to obtain an object of common value. Since
"persistent variations in behaviour over time" is the denition of personality, the
variation in strategies may be interpreted as a variation in personality. In this case,
variations in θ seem very much like variations in extraversion, since both represent
willingness to expend energy in social situations for the purpose of obtaining goods
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of reproductive value.
4.3.5 Extraverts take on more risk
One of the central features of extraversion mentioned above is that extraverts exhibit
greater taste for risk than introverts (Nettle 2005, 2006), and this is also a feature
of the current model.
PROPOSITION B: players with greater idiosyncratic values of θ (extraverts) take
on more risk, and are not compensated for doing so
PROOF: Since extraverts are characterized by higher values of θ, it is necessary to
show that the variance of fertility is increasing in θ. Since θ maps linearly onto
the bids x, we only need to show that the variance of fertility is increasing in x.
Thus suppose we have an agent i who always chooses a bid xi = z when competing
for a resource of value V . The expected payo from playing z against a randomly
chosen individual from a population which (in aggregate) follows the mixed strategy












V , the expected value of ξ(z, I) is zero for all
values of z. The variance of outcomes, however, is not equal for all values of z. The
variance of outcomes is given by




















After some manipulation (see appendix one), it is possible to show that
σ2(z, I) = V 2P (z)




p(x)dx = 1− e−
z
V
Since P (z) is strictly increasing in z, the function σ2(z, I) is also strictly increasing
in z. Another way to show this is to take the derivative of σ2(z, I) with respect to
z, and note that it is always positive
∂σ2(z, I)
∂z
= V 2p(z) > 0
Thus extraverts who choose higher bids are taking on extra risk compared to
introverts, and they are doing so without compensation, since all payos are equal
in equilibrium.
It is worth noting that players in this game are not risk loving or risk averse in the
traditional sense of having convex or concave utility functions. In any evolutionary
model in an innite population, all players must be risk neutral with regard to
fertility (as long as they do not face the risk of total extinction, which they do not in
an innite population). Thus all utility functions are linear in fertility. Furthermore,
since the relationship between resources and fertility is (in this model) linear, utility
is linear in resources as well. Thus, formally, all players have the same attitude
towards risk. But if some strategies deliver more variance than others, this means
that some agents (extraverts) must take uncompensated fertility risks. These people
will be observationally risk loving (or less risk averse) and perhaps strongly so if
the relationship between resources and fertility is concave rather than linear as I
120
have assumed (risk aversion in the real world is of course generally measured against
resources rather than fertility).
4.3.6 Asymmetry
So far we have seen that certain kinds of games will generate variation in strategies
(aka personalities) even when there is neither variation in ability nor variation in the
players' valuations. Clearly this is an oversimplication, but here we will see that
asymmetries can make the case even stronger.
There are several versions of the asymmetric war of attrition. They all have some
things in commonthey all deal with the two player case where it is assumed that
only two possible types A & B exist. A is considered to be the favoured type and
usually wins the game. Beyond this basic setup, though, the various assumptions
dier notably. We will follow the treatment of Hammerstein and Parker (1982).
Hammerstein and Parker's model has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium with a
continuous strategy space, unlike alternative models such as Nalebu and Riley's
(1985) model of private information with a continuum of asymmetric equilibria, or
Kim's (1993) version of the game which has only pure strategy equilibria and which
requires making the war of attrition discreet rather than continuous and which also
introduces trembles in the implementation of strategies.
Hammerstein and Parker's modelhenceforth simply called the asymmetric model
assumes the existence of relevant asymmetries, so that A-types have either "more
to gain or less to pay for persistence" than B-types. The asymmetry must be re-
lated to the payos. The authors note that "the continuous war of attrition with
a payo irrelevant (uncorrelated) asymmetry is a pathological structurally unstable
model, since arbitrarily small changes in the parameters would lead to fundamentally
dierent solutions".
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With two players and two possible types, there are only four contest situations:
(A,A), (A,B), (B,A) & (B,B). The probability that any randomly chosen contest
will nd player 1 in role A and player 2 in role B is denoted wAB. The other three
probabilities wAA, wBA & wBB are dened similarly. Because the "player 1" and
"player 2" labels are assigned by chance, it must be that wAB = wBA. The model
assumes that there is a nonzero probability that both contestants have the same
role, i.e. wAA 6= 0 and wBB 6= 0. These cases of unexpected symmetries arise
due to occasional errors in perception, meaning that the players have incomplete
information about their opponent's type. Although such errors may be infrequent,
they must occur with positive probability or else the game has no ESS.
This model allows for real asymmetries either in the cost of participation or in
the value of the prize. Hammerstein and Parker note that both types of asymmetry
give similar results. Thus, rather than exploring the closely related outcomes from
varying the value of the resource VAA, VAB, VBA, and VBB in the four dierent cases,
or the cost of participation CAA, CAB, CBA, and CBB, I will introduce only the
smallest of asymmetries and assume the costs of participation are still the same for
both types, but that the resource is worth VA = V + ε to the favoured A-types
(where ε is small and positive) and is worth VB = V − ε to the disfavoured B-types.
Furthermore, the value of the resource is independent of who the game is played
against (i.e. VA = VAA = VAB, and VB = VBA = VBB). It is worth noting that the
following results will hold qualitatively even when ε is large, but I will examine the
equilibrium in the limit as ε→ 0 because it provides the neatest solution.
A straightforward interpretation of roles A and B is that of possessor and in-
terloper (or "rightful owner" and "usurper"). A-types represent those who already
posses the disputed territory, mate, or whatever is at stake, while the B-type is
challenging his possession (and this is common knowledge but with some probability
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of mistaken identity as noted above). But this point is not central to the analysis.
All that we require is that the value of the prize is slightly higher for A than for B.
This might happen because of greater familiarity (the current owner does not have
to waste time learning the properties of the resource) or for any other reason. In the
simpler hawk-dove-bourgeois game, the owner-interloper split allows the relatively
ecient "bourgeois" solution to be an ESS of the game (Maynard Smith 1979)11.
The bourgeois strategy was to choose hawk when playing as the owner of the dis-
puted resource, and dove otherwise. Thus when all agents played bourgeois, the
wasteful combat was eliminated. The asymmetric game outlined here can be likened
to a continuous version of the hawk-dove-bourgeois game.
The general solution to the asymmetric model derived by Hammerstein and
Parker is one where the A-types choose their bids from an exponential distribu-
tion with a lower limit of s (i.e. xA ≥ s), while the B-types choose their bids from
an exponential distribution with an upper limit of s (i.e. xB < s). This means that
in the (A,B) and (B,A) contest situations, the A-type will always submit a higher
bid and claim the prize, while in the (A,A) and (B,B) contest situations, each player
has a chance of winning. Of course, victory will be more costly in the (A,A) case,
and is quite likely to be Pyrrhic. The general solutions for pA(x), pB(x), and s are
in the footnote12, but by assuming more symmetry than the original model requires,
we can produce something tidier.
If we dene
11Bourgeois was the only ESS in the simple version of that game, but more complicated versions
have other ESSs. See Mesterton-Gibbons (1992) for some variants on hawk-dove-bourgeois.



















So thatW is the probability that a randomly chosen B-type is actually competing
against an A-type (remember that there are occasional mistakes in perception).
And if we take the value of q in the limit as ε→ 0, we can write
s = V ln
1
W
(Or, equivalently, s = −V lnW ). This allows the equilibrium density function
for bids in the asymmetric game to be written as
pA(x,W ) =























V if 0 ≤ x < V ln 1
W
0 if V ln 1
W
≤ x
So far, the asymmetric equilibrium I have presented is just a simplied version
of the one derived by Hammerstein and Parker. It is worth briey examining these
equations to get some intuition from them. Consider what happens as W varies. As
W → 1 (i.e. as the probability wBB of a B-type facing another B-type goes to zero),
the boundary s→ 0, which means that B-types place increasing weight on values of
x close to zero, and A-types behave more and more like players in the symmetric 2
player war of attrition, producing bids which correspond in the limit to the density
function pA(x) = 1V e
− x
V with bounds (0,∞). The other extreme, where W → 0 (i.e.
as wBB → 1), means that the boundary s → ∞, and it is the B-types who come
to behave increasingly like players in the symmetric 2 player war of attrition (which
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makes sense, because most of their ghts are against other Bs).
Now we will re-express this equilibrium in terms of the personality function and
bidding rule described in the previous section. As promised in the introduction, the
asymmetric case can be described with the same functions as the symmetric case,
but there is an intermediate step as well. The intermediate step involves mapping
the person's idiosyncratic type θi onto a pair of values θAi and θ
B
i each of which can
then become inputs into the bidding rule, depending on which role player i nds
himself in.
We begin with the familiar density function for personality types
ψ(θ) = e−θ θ ∈ [0,∞)
What is needed is a rule for translating θi into θAi and θ
B
i such that these latter



















−θB if 0 ≤ ln 1
W
< θB
0 if θB ≥ ln 1
W
It is important to end up with these particular functions because they give den-
sities for θA and θB such that agents can use the same bidding rule given in the
previous section
xJi (θi,∆V ) = θ
J
i ∆V J ∈ {A,B}
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and they will produce bids at the equilibrium densities given by pA(x,W ) and
pB(x,W ) above. As for the actual mapping from θ to θJ , it can be shown (see
appendix) that the function




performs the mapping for the A-types, while the function
FB(θi,W ) = − ln
[
W + (1−W )e−θi
]
= θBi
does the requisite plotting for B-types.
Both FA and FB as well as their resulting distributions dA and dB preserve player
i's position relative to the population. This means that players' behaviors across
a range of very dierent situations will show very similar patterns. Logically, this
is not necessary. The system just described would also be stable if each player
were characterized by two distinct θ's  one for use in the favoured position, and
one for use in the disfavoured position. As long as each of the two values of θ
was taken independently from the density function e−θ, then the system would be
be in equilibrium. But a system with two dierent values of θ is redundant and
arguably less realistic, since people's behaviours are in fact correlated across a range
of situations. Furthermore, there is neurological evidence that the same brain regions
are involved in the dierent situations (discussed in the next section), which suggests
that the more parsimonious version is the better one.
So what are the implications of all this? The basic story from the previous
section still holds: people must play dierent values of x in order for ESS conditions
to prevail, and the value of x chosen by a player depends on the value of θ assigned
to him by Nature. To review: agents playing the asymmetric war of attrition are
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characterized by an idiosyncratic value θi from the distribution e−θthis is the same
value which was used to represent their type in the symmetric game. The value θi
is either amplied to θAi if player i is acting as the favoured type, or else diminished
to θBi if the player is acting as the disfavoured type. Finally, the appropriate value
of θJi is used as an input to the same rule as before, so θ
J
i times ∆V gives the bid.
Things are slightly more complicated in the asymmetric case, of course, because of
the dierent values of θAi and θ
B
i . But this additional complexity allows the model to
address other issuesnamely the existence of loss aversion and the observed variation
in intensities of loss aversion.
4.3.7 Asymmetries and loss aversion
PROPOSITION C: there is a U-shaped relationship between extraversion and loss
aversion
Consider the 'owner & interloper' interpretation of the roles A & B. In equilibrium,
owners will always submit higher bids than interlopers. I will argue that this is best
understood as a strategic endowment eect. Recall that the endowment eect is the
phenomenon whereby people value an object more highly once their property right to
it has been established. Experiments have repeatedly shown that the minimum price
that a typical owner is willing to accept for an object will generally be much higher
than the price that a typical buyer is willing to pay for the same object, even when
the roles of "buyer" and "owner" are assigned by chance and the ownership rights
are only a few minutes old (see Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990 for a summary
of several such experiments). The endowment eect is usually assumed to arise from
loss aversion, which causes losses to loom larger than equivalent gains. The eect
was rst discussed in the context of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).
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While loss aversion has been extensively documented empirically, there has been
little theoretical work to explain how the trait evolved. The asymmetric model
presented in this section provides one explanation for the origin of loss aversionthat
it may have arisen from strategic interactions where ownership cues were used to
settle the contest (hence strategic loss aversion). The basic idea is that owners
feel attached to their possessions because this feeling causes them to try harder
to keep possession than interlopers will try to take possession from them. When
owners expend more eort than interlopers, we have the essence of the asymmetric
equilibrium described above. We also have a textbook case of loss aversion.
Gintis (2007) also argues that loss aversion evolved because our ancestors played
a game similar to hawk-dove-bourgeois. He notes that bourgeois-esque strategies in
which asymmetries of ownership are used to settle contests can be an ecient way to
avoid wasteful combat in the absence of enforced property rights, and hence groups
who use such cues are likely to be favoured compared to those engaging in endless
conict. Indeed, as Gintis notes, this interpretation accounts for the fact that some
form of property rules characterise not only human societies but many animal groups
as well.
The model which Gintis uses to make his point is quite dierent from the one pre-
sented in this paper, however, even though both models share a family resemblance
to hawk-dove-bourgeois. Gintis' model, for instance, is a probabilistic model unre-
lated to Hammerstein and Parker's asymmetric war of attrition. In the Gintis model,
there is a possibility of getting the counter intuitive "anti-property" equilibria where
the interlopers are favoured over the owners, even if the owners are slightly favoured
with respect to payos. This kind of result cannot arise in the current model since
A-types are dened by the fact that they are favoured with respect to payos or
participation costs, and any equilibrium will always result in As submitting higher
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bids than Bs (Hammerstein & Parker 1982)13.
There is also another feature of loss aversion which was not addressed by Gintis,
and which has, as far as I know, never been explainedthe variation in the extent to
which people are loss averse. The degree of loss aversion is typically quantied by a
parameter λ, which measures the relative slopes of the value function for losses and
for gains. For a large sample, the average value of λ is typically somewhere around
2 (Camerer, 2003), implying that the experience of losing £1 is approximately twice
as salient as the experience of gaining £1. However most empirical studies nd that
the subjects exhibit a wide range of λsTom et al. (2007), for example, report values
ranging from 0.99 to 6.75. This kind of variation arises naturally from the current
model.
Too see how, recall that in the asymmetric case a player i is characterized by two
values θAi and θ
B
i which then become inputs to the bidding rule. But the bidding rule
can be interpreted as a utility functionwe bid more when we crave more intensely.
Since the index of loss aversion λ is generally dened (e.g. in Tversky & Kahneman




(see Köbberling & Wakker 2005 for variants on this denition) then it
is clear that in our case, we can express λi as the ratio ratio
θBi
θAi
since the ∆V term





high will be highly loss averse, and vice versa. The point to note is that the ratio is






− ln[W + (1−W )e−θi ]
13Note that both Gintis' and my own explanations are meant to account only for the relative
slopes of the value function (i.e. steeper below the horizontal axis than above it). The shape of
the value function (i.e. concave in the positive domain and convex in the negative) is likely to be
accounted for by other considerations, like diminishing marginal productivity.
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(ln[W + (1−W )e−θi ])
(
lnW − θi
(ln[W + (1−W )e−θi ])
· (1−W )e
−θi
W + (1−W )e−θi
− 1
)
This expression is negative for small values of θ and then becomes positive again
for larger values of θ, which means that the relationship between λ and θ is roughly
U -shaped in θ .




players with θ near zero will have θB near zero as well, while θA will be near s
(remember that s is the lower bound of θA and the upper bound of θB) and so the
limit of λ as θ goes to zero is ∞, implying that extreme introverts are extremely loss
averse as well. The ratio λ will then fall in θ, implying that increasing extraversion
is associated with decreasing loss aversion. At some point, however, the U bottoms
out and the relationship reverses itself. When θ tends to ∞, θB rises with a limit of
q while θA rises without bound, so the ratio θ
A
θB
tends to ∞, implying that extreme
extraverts are also extremely loss averse. The exact point at which the U inects
depends on W , and would also depend on VA, VB, CA, and CB if I had included
those variables. Thus it is not possible to make a clear prediction about how λ and
θ are related without knowing more about the types of asymmetries faced by our
ancestors. It is possible, however, to derive two implications about λ: that it will
not be constant across the population, and that the most extreme extraverts and
introverts in the population will have the highest values of λ and be the most loss
averse. The rst of these predictions has been demonstrated, as I already noted.
The second has not, to my knowledge, been tested.
The idea that this kind of a game lies at the root of loss aversion is consistent
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with the neurological evidence as discussed by Tom et al. (2007), who subjected
patients to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while exposing them to
50/50 win/loss gambles of varying size. The authors nd "..increasing activity for
gains and decreasing activity for losses [which] demonstrated joint sensitivity to both
gains and losses in a set of regions, including the dorsal and ventral striatum and
VMPFC14". This study's nding that losses and gains are coded for by the same
regions is in contrast to earlier suggestions that the gain and loss aspects were gov-
erned separately (e.g. Camerer, 2005). Also notable among Tom et al.'s ndings is
that areas of activation were "observed throughout, though not strictly limited to,
the targets of the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine (DA) systems". This is
notable because the dopamine systems exhibit considerable genetic polymorphism
across humans (Cravchik & Goldman 2000) and they are thought to be linked to
extraversion (Depue & Collins 1999). However, it is obviously dicult or impossible
to map from theoretical models such as this one to make predictions about neuro-
logical structureI oer this evidence for consideration merely because it provides an
interesting t with the theory.
4.3.8 Adding more players
The results for the two player symmetric war of attrition carry over with almost no
alteration to n players15. The n player war of attrition was rst described by Haigh
& Cannings (1989)16, and the basic setup is similar to the two player case: there are
n players competing for n prizes (Vn < Vn−1 < . . . < V1) which become available in
14Ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
15As far as I know, there is no asymmetric war of attrition for more than two players. Maynard
Smith (1982) makes the case that these are unlikely to arise in nature.
16Bulow and Klemperer (1999) generalized the n-player war of attrition to a standards situation
in which players must continue to pay after having dropped out of the game (as in the case where
an industry is ghting over a technical standard).
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ascending order of value. At the beginning of the game, all players select some cost
that they are willing to bear; the player with the lowest willingness to pay drops out
rst, collects the prize Vn and leaves the game. The remaining players then repeat
this process through a further n− 2 rounds until, eventually, the second last player
drops out with reward V2, leaving the winner to immediately collect V117.
The game has a unique mixed strategy ESS where the players choose their bids for
each round from the exponential function with mean (n̂)(∆Vn̂), where n̂ corresponds
to the number of opponents remaining18 in the game during any given round, and







Notice that when there is only one opponent left, the function pn̂(x) simplies to
the equilibrium function p(x) described in section 4.3.4 for the symmetric two player
war of attrition.
Once again, however, we would like to see a bidding rule given personality type.
The xed bidding rule for the whole population will be
xi(n̂, θi,∆V ) = n̂ · θi ·∆V
Recall that the rule was formerly written as
xi(θi,∆V ) = θi ·∆V
17The setup I describe corresponds to model C in Haigh & Cannings' paper. They also consider
n player games in which there is only one prize and consequently no ESS (this is model A) and n
player games in which the n prizes which become available in pre-determined but non-ascending
order (this is model B, and it does produce an ESS). I have restricted myself to model C because
it is simpler, but qualitatively similar results can be obtained from model B.
18The number of opponents remaining will always be equal to the number of rounds remaining
just before the current round begins. Thus n̂ begins with a value of (n− 1), and falls by one per
round so that at the beginning of the nal round, n̂ = 1.
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Clearly, the former rule is just a special case when the number of remaining
opponents is one.
Given this bidding rule, the distribution of personality types within the popula-
tion will be given by the pdf
ψ(θ) = e−θ θ ∈ [0,∞)
Once again, this is the same distribution as we had in the two player case, which
means that the inferences drawn from the basic model will continue to hold.
4.4 Conclusion
In summary, I have argued that something like a war of attrition must have charac-
terised at least some of the conicts which our ancestors entered into and that these
conicts would induce the evolution of something like the extraversion continuum. It
was shown that the simple decision rule which motivates behaviour in the symmetric
two-player case is robust to the introduction of asymmetries of ability in two-player
contests as well as to n-player contests. Furthermore, I have argued that this expla-
nation accounts for the fact that extraverts seem to take more risk than introverts,
and that it predicts a U-shaped relationship between extraversion and loss aversion.
The interpretation throughout this paper is that the behavioural variation nec-
essary to obtain equilibrium in the war of attrition is coded into the population via
dierences in subjective reward sensitivity. As outlined above, this ts with the
Lucas et al. (2000) nding that reward sensitivity lies at the core of dierences in
extraversion. But it is still very much a conjecture at this point to say that wars
of attrition led to the variance in reward sensitivity; it would be very interesting to
see data (e.g. from fMRI) which related reward sensitivity to behaviour in all-pay
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contests, but I am not aware of any such study.
The nding that extraversion should be related to risk aversion warrants a cau-
tious interpretation. As mentioned above, Nettle (2005) found that extraverts do
exhibit a greater taste for physically risky activities (like skydiving) and that they
have a correspondingly higher rate of hospitalisation. And while many economists
like to imagine that people can be well characterised by a single risk aversion pa-
rameter, in real world risk attitudes appear to be more complicated: Almlund et
al. (in press) review evidence that risk aversion has been linked to sensation seeking
(a facet of extraversion), openness to experience, neuroticism, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness (i.e. all ve of the Big Five), and Anderson and Mellor (2009)
showed that risk attitudes are not stable across elicitation methods. If risk attitudes
are indeed multi-faceted then it will prove dicult or impossible to produce a single
theory of their evolution, and the current paper must be interpreted as an attempt
to explain that part of risk aversion which relates primarily to behaviour in status
and resource contests.
The nding that extraversion should be related to loss aversion is, as noted above,
untested (to my knowledge). But given the rapid proliferation of personality and
economics experiments documented in Almlund et al. (in press) and in several of
James Heckman's other writings, it is likely that such a test will be conducted shortly,
if indeed it is not already in press.
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Appendix
A1. Calculating the variance of payos
These calculations show how the variance of outcomes changes with the choice of
bid in a polymorphic population playing the two player war of attrition. First, note
that the equilibrium pdf for the war of attrition is given by the probability density










p(x)dx = 1− e−
z
V
The expected payo from playing any bid z against an opponent who plays the








Given p(x) above, ξ(z, I) takes a value of 0 for all z. Thus the variance of
outcomes is














































x2p(x)dx+ z2(1− P (z))
(See below for IBP#1)
σ2(z, I) = V 2P (z)− 2V (V P (z)− z[1− P (z)]) +
zˆ
0
x2p(x)dx+ z2(1− P (z))
σ2(z, I) = V 2P (z)− 2V 2P (z) + 2V z(1− P (z)) +
zˆ
0
x2p(x)dx+ z2(1− P (z))
σ2(z, I) = −V 2P (z) + 2V z(1− P (z)) +
zˆ
0
x2p(x)dx+ z2(1− P (z))
(See below for IBP#2)
σ2(z, I) = −V 2P (z)+2V z(1−P (z))+[−z2(1−P (z))+2V zP (z)+2V 2P (z)−2V z]+z2(1−P (z))
σ2(z, I) = −V 2P (z) + 2V z + 2V 2P (z)− 2V z
σ2(z, I) = V 2P (z)
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Since P (z) is strictly increasing in z, the function σ2(z, I) is also increasing in z.
This can also be shown by taking the derivative of σ2(z, I) with respect to z:
δσ2(z, I)
δz
= V 2p(z) > 0
Integration by parts #1
ˆ z
0





x · p(x)dx = zP (z)− [z + V e−
z
V − V ]
ˆ z
0
x · p(x)dx = V P (z)− z(1− P (z))






























x2p(x)dx = z2P (z)− z2 + 2V zP (z) + 2V 2P (z)− 2V z
ˆ z
0
x2p(x)dx = −z2(1− P (z)) + 2V zP (z) + 2V 2P (z)− 2V z
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A2. The functions FA and FB
Given the density function
ψ(θ) = e−θ θ ∈ [0,∞)




























θB ∈ [0, q)









What we want is a function FA(z) = a such that Dψ(z) = DA(a), and another
function FB(z) = b such that Dψ(z) = DB(b). These functions FA and FB will
permit an agent with θi = z to maintain his relative place in the distribution when
he sets θAi = a and θ
B
i = b. Beginning with the A-types
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−z = ln 1
W
− a
a = z + ln
1
W




And likewise for the B-types












e−b = 1− (1−W − e−z +We−z)




W + (1−W )e−z
]
b = − ln
[
W + (1−W )e−z
]
FB(θi,W ) = − ln
[
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General Appendix
A brief guide to personality theory
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Table 4.1: Short guide to the Five Factor Model
Domain Brief description
Neuroticism suceptibility to fear, anxiety and other negative emotions
Extraversion energy, positive emotions and sociability
Openness appreciation for art, emotion and left-leaning politics
Agreeableness tendency to be compassionate, cooperative and trusting
Conscientiousness self-discipline, sense of duty, achievement striving
The Five Factor Model is credited largely to the work of Paul Costa and Robert
McCrae, who wrote prolicaly about it in the 1990s (see references in Chapter 2).
They showed that in nearly all personality tests, there are ve orthogonal dimensions
along which people vary, similar to those given above. Considerable consensus has
emerged around this nding within the past 10 years, so that it can now be considered
the central model within personality psychology.
One point worth stressing about the FFM is that it is a descriptive rather than a
theoretical model of personality. While there are theoretical interpretations which
have been created to explain the existence of the ve factors, there is little consensus
about the theory.
Table 4.2: IPIP's NEO 300
Note: This table shows the 300 items of the International
Personality Item Pool's NEO questionnaire referred to in Chapter
3. The rst column gives the question number (questions cycle
through domains in the order Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness). The second column
indicates whether the question correlates positives or negatively
with its domain. The third/fourth columns indicate which of the
30 facets each item belongs to. The nal column gives the text of
the item itself.
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# +/- Facet Item
1 + N1 Anxiety Worry about things.
2 + E1 Friendliness Make friends easily.
3 + O1 Imagination Have a vivid imagination.
4 + A1 Trust Trust others.
5 + C1 Self-Ecacy Complete tasks
successfully.
6 + N2 Anger Get angry easily.
7 + E2 Gregariousness Love large parties.
8 + O2 Artistic Interests Believe in the importance
of art.
9 + A2 Morality Would never cheat on my
taxes.
10 + C2 Orderliness Like order.
11 + N3 Depression Often feel blue.
12 + E3 Assertiveness Take charge.
13 + O3 Emotionality Experience my emotions
intensely.
14 + A3 Altruism Make people feel welcome.
15 + C3 Dutifulness Try to follow the rules.
16 + N4 Self-Consciousness Am easily intimidated.
17 + E4 Activity Level Am always busy.
18 + O4 Adventurousness Prefer variety to routine.
19 + A4 Cooperation Am easy to satisfy.
20 + C4 Achievement-Striving Go straight for the goal.
21 + N5 Immoderation Often eat too much.
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22 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Love excitement.
23 + O5 Intellect Like to solve complex
problems.
24 + A5 Modesty Dislike being the center of
attention.
25 + C5 Self-Discipline Get chores done right away.
26 + N6 Vulnerability Panic easily.
27 + E6 Cheerfulness Radiate joy.
28 + O6 Liberalism Tend to vote for liberal
political candidates.
29 + A6 Sympathy Sympathize with the
homeless.
30 + C6 Cautiousness Avoid mistakes.
31 + N1 Anxiety Fear for the worst.
32 + E1 Friendliness Warm up quickly to others.
33 + O1 Imagination Enjoy wild ights of
fantasy.
34 + A1 Trust Believe that others have
good intentions.
35 + C1 Self-Ecacy Excel in what I do.
36 + N2 Anger Get irritated easily.
37 + E2 Gregariousness Talk to a lot of dierent
people at parties.
38 + O2 Artistic Interests Like music.
39 + A2 Morality Stick to the rules.
40 + C2 Orderliness Like to tidy up.
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41 + N3 Depression Dislike myself.
42 + E3 Assertiveness Try to lead others.
43 + O3 Emotionality Feel others' emotions.
44 + A3 Altruism Anticipate the needs of
others.
45 + C3 Dutifulness Keep my promises.
46 + N4 Self-Consciousness Am afraid that I will do
the wrong thing.
47 + E4 Activity Level Am always on the go.
48 + O4 Adventurousness Like to visit new places.
49 + A4 Cooperation Can't stand confrontations.
50 + C4 Achievement-Striving Work hard.
51 + N5 Immoderation Don't know why I do some
of the things I do.
52 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Seek adventure.
53 + O5 Intellect Love to read challenging
material.
54 + A5 Modesty Dislike talking about
myself.
55 + C5 Self-Discipline Am always prepared.
56 + N6 Vulnerability Become overwhelmed by
events.
57 + E6 Cheerfulness Have a lot of fun.
58 + O6 Liberalism Believe that there is no
absolute right or wrong.
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59 + A6 Sympathy Feel sympathy for those
who are worse o than
myself.
60 + C6 Cautiousness Choose my words with
care.
61 + N1 Anxiety Am afraid of many things.
62 + E1 Friendliness Feel comfortable around
people.
63 + O1 Imagination Love to daydream.
64 + A1 Trust Trust what people say.
65 + C1 Self-Ecacy Handle tasks smoothly.
66 + N2 Anger Get upset easily.
67 + E2 Gregariousness Enjoy being part of a
group.
68 + O2 Artistic Interests See beauty in things that
others might not notice.
69 - A2 Morality Use attery to get ahead.
70 + C2 Orderliness Want everything to be
"just right."""
71 + N3 Depression Am often down in the
dumps.
72 + E3 Assertiveness Can talk others into doing
things.
73 + O3 Emotionality Am passionate about
causes.
74 + A3 Altruism Love to help others.
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75 + C3 Dutifulness Pay my bills on time.
76 + N4 Self-Consciousness Find it dicult to
approach others.
77 + E4 Activity Level Do a lot in my spare time.
78 + O4 Adventurousness Interested in many things.
79 + A4 Cooperation Hate to seem pushy.
80 + C4 Achievement-Striving Turn plans into actions.
81 + N5 Immoderation Do things I later regret.
82 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Love action.
83 + O5 Intellect Have a rich vocabulary.
84 + A5 Modesty Consider myself an average
person.
85 + C5 Self-Discipline Start tasks right away.
86 + N6 Vulnerability Feel that I'm unable to
deal with things.
87 + E6 Cheerfulness Express childlike joy.
88 + O6 Liberalism Believe that criminals
should receive help rather
than punishment.
89 + A6 Sympathy Value cooperation over
competition.
90 + C6 Cautiousness Stick to my chosen path.
91 + N1 Anxiety Get stressed out easily.
92 + E1 Friendliness Act comfortably with
others.
93 + O1 Imagination Like to get lost in thought.
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94 + A1 Trust Believe that people are
basically moral.
95 + C1 Self-Ecacy Am sure of my ground.
96 + N2 Anger Am often in a bad mood.
97 + E2 Gregariousness Involve others in what I am
doing.
98 + O2 Artistic Interests Love owers.
99 - A2 Morality Use others for my own
ends.
100 + C2 Orderliness Love order and regularity.
101 + N3 Depression Have a low opinion of
myself.
102 + E3 Assertiveness Seek to inuence others.
103 + O3 Emotionality Enjoy examining myself
and my life.
104 + A3 Altruism Am concerned about
others.
105 + C3 Dutifulness Tell the truth.
106 + N4 Self-Consciousness Am afraid to draw
attention to myself.
107 + E4 Activity Level Can manage many things
at the same time.
108 + O4 Adventurousness Like to begin new things.
109 - A4 Cooperation Have a sharp tongue.
110 + C4 Achievement-Striving Plunge into tasks with all
my heart.
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111 + N5 Immoderation Go on binges.
112 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Enjoy being part of a loud
crowd.
113 + O5 Intellect Can handle a lot of
information.
114 + A5 Modesty Seldom toot my own horn.
115 + C5 Self-Discipline Get to work at once.
116 + N6 Vulnerability Can't make up my mind.
117 + E6 Cheerfulness Laugh my way through life.
118 - O6 Liberalism Believe in one true religion.
119 + A6 Sympathy Suer from others' sorrows.
120 - C6 Cautiousness Jump into things without
thinking.
121 + N1 Anxiety Get caught up in my
problems.
122 + E1 Friendliness Cheer people up.
123 + O1 Imagination Indulge in my fantasies.
124 + A1 Trust Believe in human goodness.
125 + C1 Self-Ecacy Come up with good
solutions.
126 + N2 Anger Lose my temper.
127 + E2 Gregariousness Love surprise parties.
128 + O2 Artistic Interests Enjoy the beauty of nature.
129 - A2 Morality Know how to get around
the rules.
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130 + C2 Orderliness Do things according to a
plan.
131 + N3 Depression Have frequent mood
swings.
132 + E3 Assertiveness Take control of things.
133 + O3 Emotionality Try to understand myself.
134 + A3 Altruism Have a good word for
everyone.
135 + C3 Dutifulness Listen to my conscience.
136 + N4 Self-Consciousness Only feel comfortable with
friends.
137 + E4 Activity Level React quickly.
138 - O4 Adventurousness Prefer to stick with things
that I know.
139 - A4 Cooperation Contradict others.
140 + C4 Achievement-Striving Do more than what's
expected of me.
141 + N5 Immoderation Love to eat.
142 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Enjoy being reckless.
143 + O5 Intellect Enjoy thinking about
things.
144 - A5 Modesty Believe that I am better
than others.
145 + C5 Self-Discipline Carry out my plans.
146 + N6 Vulnerability Get overwhelmed by
emotions.
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147 + E6 Cheerfulness Love life.
148 - O6 Liberalism Tend to vote for
conservative political
candidates.
149 - A6 Sympathy Am not interested in other
people's problems.
150 - C6 Cautiousness Make rash decisions.
151 - N1 Anxiety Am not easily bothered by
things.
152 - E1 Friendliness Am hard to get to know.
153 + O1 Imagination Spend time reecting on
things.
154 + A1 Trust Think that all will be well.
155 + C1 Self-Ecacy Know how to get things
done.
156 - N2 Anger Rarely get irritated.
157 - E2 Gregariousness Prefer to be alone.
158 - O2 Artistic Interests Do not like art.
159 - A2 Morality Cheat to get ahead.
160 - C2 Orderliness Often forget to put things
back in their proper place.
161 + N3 Depression Feel desperate.
162 - E3 Assertiveness Wait for others to lead the
way.
163 - O3 Emotionality Seldom get emotional.
164 - A3 Altruism Look down on others.
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165 - C3 Dutifulness Break rules.
166 + N4 Self-Consciousness Stumble over my words.
167 - E4 Activity Level Like to take it easy.
168 - O4 Adventurousness Dislike changes.
169 - A4 Cooperation Love a good ght.
170 + C4 Achievement-Striving Set high standards for
myself and others.
171 - N5 Immoderation Rarely overindulge.
172 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Act wild and crazy.
173 - O5 Intellect Am not interested in
abstract ideas.
174 - A5 Modesty Think highly of myself.
175 - C5 Self-Discipline Find it dicult to get
down to work.
176 - N6 Vulnerability Remain calm under
pressure.
177 + E6 Cheerfulness Look at the bright side of
life.
178 - O6 Liberalism Believe that too much tax
money goes to support
artists.
179 - A6 Sympathy Tend to dislike soft-hearted
people.
180 - C6 Cautiousness Like to act on a whim.
181 - N1 Anxiety Am relaxed most of the
time.
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182 - E1 Friendliness Often feel uncomfortable
around others.
183 - O1 Imagination Seldom daydream.
184 - A1 Trust Distrust people.
185 - C1 Self-Ecacy Misjudge situations.
186 - N2 Anger Seldom get mad.
187 - E2 Gregariousness Want to be left alone.
188 - O2 Artistic Interests Do not like poetry.
189 - A2 Morality Put people under pressure.
190 - C2 Orderliness Leave a mess in my room.
191 + N3 Depression Feel that my life lacks
direction.
192 - E3 Assertiveness Keep in the background.
193 - O3 Emotionality Am not easily aected by
my emotions.
194 - A3 Altruism Am indierent to the
feelings of others.
195 - C3 Dutifulness Break my promises.
196 - N4 Self-Consciousness Am not embarrassed easily.
197 - E4 Activity Level Like to take my time.
198 - O4 Adventurousness Don't like the idea of
change.
199 - A4 Cooperation Yell at people.
200 + C4 Achievement-Striving Demand quality.
201 - N5 Immoderation Easily resist temptations.
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202 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Willing to try anything
once.
203 - O5 Intellect Avoid philosophical
discussions.
204 - A5 Modesty Have a high opinion of
myself.
205 - C5 Self-Discipline Waste my time.
206 - N6 Vulnerability Can handle complex
problems.
207 + E6 Cheerfulness Laugh aloud.
208 - O6 Liberalism Believe laws should be
strictly enforced.
209 - A6 Sympathy Believe in an eye for an eye.
210 - C6 Cautiousness Rush into things.
211 - N1 Anxiety Am not easily disturbed by
events.
212 - E1 Friendliness Avoid contacts with others.
213 - O1 Imagination Do not have a good
imagination.
214 - A1 Trust Suspect hidden motives in
others.
215 - C1 Self-Ecacy Don't understand things.
216 - N2 Anger Am not easily annoyed.
217 - E2 Gregariousness Don't like crowded events.
218 - O2 Artistic Interests Do not enjoy going to art
museums.
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219 - A2 Morality Pretend to be concerned
for others.
220 - C2 Orderliness Leave my belongings
around.
221 - N3 Depression Seldom feel blue.
222 - E3 Assertiveness Have little to say.
223 - O3 Emotionality Rarely notice my emotional
reactions.
224 - A3 Altruism Make people feel
uncomfortable.
225 - C3 Dutifulness Get others to do my duties.
226 - N4 Self-Consciousness Am comfortable in
unfamiliar situations.
227 - E4 Activity Level Like a leisurely lifestyle.
228 - O4 Adventurousness Am a creature of habit.
229 - A4 Cooperation Insult people.
230 - C4 Achievement-Striving Am not highly motivated
to succeed.
231 - N5 Immoderation Am able to control my
cravings.
232 + E5 Excitement-Seeking Seek danger.
233 - O5 Intellect Have diculty
understanding abstract
ideas.
234 - A5 Modesty Know the answers to many
questions.
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235 - C5 Self-Discipline Need a push to get started.
236 - N6 Vulnerability Know how to cope.
237 + E6 Cheerfulness Amuse my friends.
238 - O6 Liberalism Believe that we coddle
criminals too much.
239 - A6 Sympathy Try not to think about the
needy.
240 - C6 Cautiousness Do crazy things.
241 - N1 Anxiety Don't worry about things
that have already
happened.
242 - E1 Friendliness Am not really interested in
others.
243 - O1 Imagination Seldom get lost in thought.
244 - A1 Trust Am wary of others.
245 - C1 Self-Ecacy Have little to contribute.
246 - N2 Anger Keep my cool.
247 - E2 Gregariousness Avoid crowds.
248 - O2 Artistic Interests Do not like concerts.
249 - A2 Morality Take advantage of others.
250 - C2 Orderliness Am not bothered by messy
people.
251 - N3 Depression Feel comfortable with
myself.
252 - E3 Assertiveness Don't like to draw
attention to myself.
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253 - O3 Emotionality Experience very few
emotional highs and lows.
254 - A3 Altruism Turn my back on others.
255 - C3 Dutifulness Do the opposite of what is
asked.
256 - N4 Self-Consciousness Am not bothered by
dicult social situations.
257 - E4 Activity Level Let things proceed at their
own pace.
258 - O4 Adventurousness Dislike new foods.
259 - A4 Cooperation Get back at others.
260 - C4 Achievement-Striving Do just enough work to get
by.
261 - N5 Immoderation Never spend more than I
can aord.
262 - E5 Excitement-Seeking Would never go hang
gliding or bungee jumping.
263 - O5 Intellect Am not interested in
theoretical discussions.
264 - A5 Modesty Boast about my virtues.
265 - C5 Self-Discipline Have diculty starting
tasks.
266 - N6 Vulnerability Readily overcome setbacks.
267 - E6 Cheerfulness Am not easily amused.
268 - O6 Liberalism Believe that we should be
tough on crime.
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269 - A6 Sympathy Believe people should fend
for themselves.
270 - C6 Cautiousness Act without thinking.
271 - N1 Anxiety Adapt easily to new
situations.
272 - E1 Friendliness Keep others at a distance.
273 - O1 Imagination Have diculty imagining
things.
274 - A1 Trust Believe that people are
essentially evil.
275 - C1 Self-Ecacy Don't see the consequences
of things.
276 - N2 Anger Rarely complain.
277 - E2 Gregariousness Seek quiet.
278 - O2 Artistic Interests Do not enjoy watching
dance performances.
279 - A2 Morality Obstruct others' plans.
280 - C2 Orderliness Am not bothered by
disorder.
281 - N3 Depression Am very pleased with
myself.
282 - E3 Assertiveness Hold back my opinions.
283 - O3 Emotionality Don't understand people
who get emotional.
284 - A3 Altruism Take no time for others.
285 - C3 Dutifulness Misrepresent the facts.
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286 - N4 Self-Consciousness Am able to stand up for
myself.
287 - E4 Activity Level React slowly.
288 - O4 Adventurousness Am attached to
conventional ways.
289 - A4 Cooperation Hold a grudge.
290 - C4 Achievement-Striving Put little time and eort
into my work.
291 - N5 Immoderation Never splurge.
292 - E5 Excitement-Seeking Dislike loud music.
293 - O5 Intellect Avoid dicult reading
material.
294 - A5 Modesty Make myself the center of
attention.
295 - C5 Self-Discipline Postpone decisions.
296 - N6 Vulnerability Am calm even in tense
situations.
297 - E6 Cheerfulness Seldom joke around.
298 - O6 Liberalism Like to stand during the
national anthem.
299 - A6 Sympathy Can't stand weak people.
300 - C6 Cautiousness Often make last-minute
plans.
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